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THE NEW STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR PRISONERS' RIGHTS:
A "TURNER" FOR THE WORSE?
TURNER v. SAFLEY
[T]he way a society treats those who have transgressed against
it is evidence of the essential character of that society.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution guarantees every citizen certain fun-
damental rights.2 When unlawful governmental action impinges upon
constitutional rights, "federal courts [must] discharge their duty to pro-
tect" them 3 by declaring the action unconstitutional.4 Generally, the
1. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523-24 (1984).
2. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry); Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate travel); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote and participate in
electoral process); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to pri-
vacy); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (freedom of association); see also
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.7 (3d ed. 1986)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] (discussing fundamental rights defined by
Supreme Court). Fundamental rights are defined as those which the Supreme
Court recognizes as being so essential to individual liberty in our society that
they deserve judicial review and protection from acts of the legislative and exec-
utive branches of government. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-
10 to -12 (1978). Fundamental rights include the fundamental guarantees of the
Bill of Rights and six other substantive categories of rights that the Supreme
Court has defined as fundamental. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra, § 11.7. Those
fundamental rights as defined by the Court include: 1) freedom of association;
2) the right to interstate travel; 3) the right to vote; 4) the right to fair proceed-
ings before a person is deprived of personal liberty; 5) the right to fairness in
criminal proceedings (implicitly recognized by the Supreme Court in a number
of cases); and 6) the right to freedom of choice in marital and family decisions.
Id.
3. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974) (citing Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969)) (policy of judicial restraint cannot justify fail-
ure to recognize prisoners' valid constitutional claims regardless of context in
which they arise). For a discussion of Martinez, see infra notes 45-57 and accom-
panying text.
Governmental action that is subject to judicial review includes not only for-
mal legislative enactments but also administrative agency rules and regulations
such as those promulgated by state departments of correction. See B. SCHWARTZ,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.1 (2d ed. 1984).
4. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974). The fourteenth
amendment provides that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall
... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court has interpreted the equal
protection clause as protecting a range of individual rights against legislative
encroachment. R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.1-.2 (1986) [hereinafter SUB-
(393)
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courts apply one of several established standards of review to the gov-
ernmental action in determining its constitutionality. 5 The standards of
review vary in their degree of scrutiny,6 and which standard will be ap-
plied depends on two factors: (1) the nature of the right in question and
(2) whether the challenged action completely abrogates or merely re-
stricts the exercise of an individual's constitutional rights. 7
In the past two centuries, the American judiciaries' reluctance to
hear prisoners' complaints had the practical effect of denying them en-
STANCE AND PROCEDURE]. In order for legislation that impinges on an
individual's rights to withstand constitutional challenge, the state must demon-
strate a "compelling," an "important" or a "legitimate" state interest, depend-
ing on the nature of the right being impinged, in support of the legislation. Id.
at § 18.3.
5. See J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 10.01 (1981). The
Supreme Court has developed three distinct standards of review for equal pro-
tection analysis: (1) "strict scrutiny," the highest standard, requires that there
be a close connection between the legislation or practice and a compelling state
interest, and that the legislation be narrowly drawn to encompass only the rec-
ognized state interests, thereby infringing as little as possible on fundamental
rights; (2) the intermediate standard requires a substantial relationship to an
important, albeit not compelling, state interest; and (3) the lowest standard,
known as the "rational relationship" or "rational basis" test requires only that a
rational basis exist for the legislative classifications, and that the practice in
question logically furthers a legitimate governmental interest. See generally SUB-
STANCE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 4, § 18.3 (discussing standards of review
under equal protection guarantee); L. TRIBE, supra note 2, §§ 16-2, -6, -30 (dis-
cussing minimum rationality, strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny standards
of review). For a fuller discussion of these standards of review, see infra notes
18-26 and accompanying text. For a discussion of fundamental rights, see supra
note 2 and accompanying text.
6. See J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 5, § 10.01. Professor Tribe has
called the rational basis or "minimum rationality" standard "toothless." L.
TRIBE, supra note 2, § 16-30, at 1082. Courts employing this standard are ex-
tremely deferential to state interests whether or not the facts justifying the
state's interest (1) actually exist, (2) would adequately support the regulation if
they did exist, or (3) have ever been actually cited in support of the regulation.
Id. § 16-3, at 996. Professor Tribe suggests that courts may apply an intermedi-
ate standard of review in several ways: Courts may require that the state interest
served by the restriction be "important" (which is something less than "compel-
ling" under strict scrutiny) rather than merely legitimate. Id. § 16-30, at 1082-
83. Courts may require that the governmental regulations be substantially re-
lated to achieving the state's interests to justify the regulations. Id. at 1083.
Courts may also refuse to hypothesize the purpose behind the rules and require
the legislature to articulate a rationale to support the regulation. Id. at 1083-85.
Relatedly, courts may reject after-the-fact rationalizations invoked to support a
regulation initially adopted without the appropriate rationale in mind. Id. at
1085-88. Finally, courts may require that a challenged regulation be altered to
permit rebuttal of the presumption of constitutionality in individual cases even if
the regulation is not struck down in its entirety. Id. at 1088-89. For a discussion
and comparison of the degree of scrutiny provided by each standard of review,
see infra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
7. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-20, at 683.
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forceable constitutional rights.8 More recently, however, courts have
extended constitutional protection to prisoners,9 though the extent of
that protection is uncertain.' 0 Another area of uncertainty is the proper
standard of review to be used in prisoners' rights cases." The Supreme
Court's recent decision in Turner v. Safley 12 settled this uncertainty by
outlining the applicable standard to prisoners' first amendment rights
and their fundamental right to marry. 13 The Turner Court held that a
8. SeeJ. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.00, at 1. For a brief history
of the status of prisoners' rights, see infra notes 27-41 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 575-76 (1974) (constitutional
status of prisoner's first, sixth and fourteenth amendment rights is far from
clear); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974) (although both par-
ties to correspondence have interest in communicating with each other, status of
prisoner's claim not decided because outsider's claim derived from first and
fourteenth amendments is sufficient basis for deciding case independent of what
prisoner's rights may be); see alsoJ. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 5, § 4.0, at
100 ("The Supreme Court has stated that prison inmates retain those First
Amendment rights not inconsistent with their status as prisoners or with the
legitimate penological objectives of the correction system, but few decisions
have given content to this standard."); cf. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972)
(per curiam) (assuming allegation that prison prohibited prisoner from exercis-
ing religious beliefs to be true in motion to dismiss, state violated prisoner's first
and fourteenth amendment rights); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964)
(per curiam) (same).
10. See Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987). Justice O'Connor, writing
for the majority, stated that "federal courts must take cognizance of the valid
constitutional claims of prison inmates. Prison walls do not form a barrier sepa-
rating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution." Id. at 2259 (ci-
tation omitted); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prisoners
entitled to due process protections); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)
(same); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (acknowledging prisoner's right
to petition government for redress of grievances); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S.
333 (1968) (prisoners protected against racial discrimination by equal protec-
tion clause).
11. See Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987); see also Procunier v. Marti-
nez, 416 U.S. 396, 406-07 (1974) (noting disparate standards of review applied
by lower courts); J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 5, § 4.00 (noting secure
position of first amendment rights of society at large and relative uncertainty of
status of prisoners' first amendment rights); Comment, The Religious Rights of the
Incarcerated, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 812, 837 (1977) (in context of religious free exer-
cise, "[d]ifferent courts apply different tests to essentially similar facts, and occa-
sionally one court applies several different tests to the facts of a single case").
For a discussion of the standards of review applied by the courts of appeals prior
to Turner v. Safley, see infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of Turner v. Safley, see infra notes 111-58 and accompanying text.
12. 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987). For a discussion of the facts, holding and ra-
tionale of Turner, see infra notes 111-58 and accompanying text.
13. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2261-63. While the Supreme Court applied the
Turner standard of review to both the first amendment correspondence regula-
tion and the marriage regulation, the Court did not indicate whether it intended
the standard to apply only to those specific rights at issue in Turner, to all funda-
mental rights, or to other constitutional rights, for example, the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, etc. See id.
This Note will focus on those rights specifically addressed in Turner, prison-
ers' first amendment rights and the right to freedom of choice in marital and
3
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prison regulation that impinges upon prisoners' constitutional rights is
constitutionally valid if it is reasonably related to a legitimate penologi-
cal interest.' 4 The Turner Court clarified this "reasonable relationship"
standard by outlining four factors to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of the prison regulation at issue. 15 These factors pro-
vide a greater degree of scrutiny than would the more lenient rational
basis standard.' 6 Thus, the Turner Court seems to have adopted a new
standard which, at least on its face, would provide for an intermediate
standard of review in prisoners' rights cases. 1 7
This Note will examine the recognition and development of prison-
ers' rights by the Supreme Court and will highlight the standards uti-
lized by the Court in evaluating challenged prison regulations and
practices that allegedly impinge upon prisoners' constitutional rights.
Specifically, this Note will address regulations affecting the rights to
freedom of speech and privacy. This Note will then examine the Turner
Court's decision and consider its potential effect upon prisoners' consti-
tutional rights. Finally, this Note will suggest an alternative standard of
review that would respect the professional expertise of prison officials
while protecting prisoners' rights.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Standards of Review for Non-Prisoner Cases
Traditionally, when a government regulation was challenged as a
family decisions. For a discussion of the Turner Court's application of the stan-
dard of review to the correspondence and marriage regulations, see infra notes
135-48 and accompanying text.
14. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2261. The Turner Court stated that "when a prison
regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it
is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Id. Legitimate peno-
logical interests include security, institutional discipline and rehabilitation. See
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974). For a discussion of the standard
employed by the Turner Court, see infra notes 125-35 and accompanying text.
15. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262. The Court stated that four factors should be
considered in determining the reasonableness of a prison regulation:
(1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation
and the legitimate governmental interest cited to justify the restriction;
(2) whether there are alternative means available to the prisoner of exercising
the right; (3) whether accommodating the constitutional right will have an ad-
verse "ripple effect" on guards, inmates and the allocation of prison resources;
and (4) whether there are ready alternatives to accommodate the right. Id. For a
detailed discussion of these considerations, see infra notes 125-32 and accompa-
nying text.
16. See Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2261-62. For a discussion of the standards of
review generally applied by the Supreme Court, see infra notes 18-26 and ac-
companying text.
17. For a discussion of the intermediate standard of review, see infra notes
24-26 and accompanying text. For a discussion of why the Turner standard does
not, in effect, provide an intermediate level of scrutiny, see infra notes 162-88
and accompanying text.
4
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violation of an individual's rights, equal protection analysis proceeded
along one of two tiers with courts applying either a strict scrutiny1 8 or a
rational basis standard of review.l 9 Under a strict scrutiny standard, the
government must demonstrate a compelling state interest that bears a
close connection to the challenged regulation.2 0 In contrast, under a
rational relationship standard, a regulation will be upheld if the review-
ing court finds that it rationally furthers a legitimate governmental inter-
est.2 ' Under this highly deferential standard, a state's actions enjoy a
18. Under this two-tier approach, when a statute impinges upon the exer-
cise of a fundamental right or when it affects a suspect class, the reviewing court
will subject the regulation to a strict scrutiny standard of review. CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw, supra note 2, § 14.3, at 531. Suspect classes include alienage, race
and ancestry. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 185 (1964) (race); Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633 (1948) (ancestry). For a discussion of fundamental rights, see supra
note 2.
19. See SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 4, § 18.3, at 324-28 (over-
view of equal protection standards of review).
20. CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, supra note 2, § 14.3, at 530. A compelling state
interest is one of such great magnitude that it justifies the limitation of funda-
mental constitutional values. Id. In examining the legislation, the court will not
defer to the decision of the legislative and executive branches, but will indepen-
dently determine the closeness of the connection between the means and the
state interest asserted. Id. This standard of review applies where the govern-
ment regulation in question either classifies persons in terms of their ability to
exercise a fundamental right or burdens a suspect class which generally means a
group defined in terms of race or national origin. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2,
§ 16-6, at 1000.
21. The Supreme Court traditionally uses a "rational relationship" stan-
dard in reviewing general social and economic regulations challenged on equal
protection grounds. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234-39 (1981)
(under rational basis test Court upheld Social Security Act classification reduc-
ing Medicaid benefits to persons institutionalized in public mental health care
facilities); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 465-66 (1981)
(Court reversed state court determination that restriction on plastic milk con-
tainers violated equal protection clause); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-76 (1980) (Court upheld retirement act classification
under rational basis test allowing double benefits to class of employees); Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 324-26 (1980) (Hyde Amendment does not violate
equal protection because Amendment, in denying funding to indigent women
for abortions, satisfies constitutional standard; by encouraging childbirth,
Amendment is rationally related to legitimate governmental objective of pro-
tecting potential life); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
44-53 (1973) (state system of funding education resulting in substantial interdis-
trict disparities in per-pupil expenditures due to differences in value of assessa-
ble property among districts while imperfect bears rational relationship to
legitimate state purpose of assuring basic education); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970) (state regulation setting ceiling on welfare dis-
bursements is rationally supportable as furthering state's legitimate interest in
encouraging employment and maintaining equitable balance between welfare
families and families of working poor); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
425-27 (1961) (upheld Maryland law permitting only certain merchants to sell
goods on Sundays normally sold by other merchants as well because law is not
without rational relation to goal of legislation); see also J. GOBERT & N. COHEN,
supra note 5, § 10.01, at 290.
5
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presumption of reasonableness.2 2 Furthermore, even where the legisla-
tive body may not have articulated the purpose or governmental interest
supporting the regulation, the court will uphold the regulation if it can
merely hypothesize such a purpose or interest. 2 3
A number of decisions during the era of the Burger Court added an
intermediate standard of review to the traditional two-tier model of
equal protection. 2 4 A court applying this intermediate standard deter-
mines whether a challenged regulation is "substantially related" to the
achievement of an "important governmental objective[]." ' 25 This stan-
dard is most often applied when a statute impinges upon the exercise of
an important nonfundamental right, or affects a particular class of peo-
ple, such as gender-based or illegitimacy classifications which do not rise
to the level of suspect classification. 2 6
22. Turkington, Equal Protection of the Laws in Illinois, 25 DE PAUL L. REV.
385, 387-88 (1976). Professor Gunther has suggested that a rational basis stan-
dard of review has typically meant "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually
none in fact." Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). In fact,
since 1937, only one equal protection challenge to economic or social legislation
has been successful when a rational basis standard was applied and this case was
subsequently overruled. See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); New Orleans
v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per curiam) (overruling Morey). After 1937, the
Supreme Court declined to engage in any meaningful review of social and eco-
nomic legislation because of its view that the federal judiciary has no inherent or
institutional superiority in determining the rationality of such legislation. CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 2, § 14.3, at 530.
23. Turkington, supra note 22, at 388; see, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 425-27 (1961) (Court upheld state statute prohibiting sale of certain
items on Sunday, hypothesizing that legislature could have reasonably deter-
mined that statute was necessary for health of community by enhancing recrea-
tional atmosphere); Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528-30 (1959)
(exemption from taxation on contents of warehouse for non-resident holding
goods for storage only held not irrational because state legislature might have
desired to encourage non-residents to construct warehouses).
24. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidated law prohibit-
ing sale of beer with 3.2% alcohol content to males under age 21 but permitting
sale to females at age 18); Picket v. Brown, 426 U.S. 1 (1983) (invalidated law
requiring paternity suit for child support of illegitimate child be brought before
child was two years old where there was no time limit in cases of legitimate chil-
dren); Frontier v. Richards, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (invalidated law permitting
male members of armed forces automatic dependency allowance for their wives
while female members had to prove husbands' dependency).
25. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
26. SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 4, at 328; see also Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 345-48 (1949)
(discussing reasonable, over-inclusive and under-inclusive classifications); SUB-
STANCE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 4, § 18.2, at 320-21 (discussing governmen-
tal classifications and equal protection).
398
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B. Constitutional Rights of Prisoners
1. The Development of Case Law Dealing with Prisoners' Rights
Historically, courts refused to hear prisoners' complaints or to in-
terfere with the administration of prisons. 27 Courts considered prison-
ers to be " 'slave[s] of the State,' having 'not only forfeited [their]
liberty, but all [their] personal rights .... , ,,28 This judicial refusal of
jurisdiction has been coined the "hands-off" doctrine. 2 9 The courts'
position of absolute deference to prison officials continued almost com-
pletely uninterrupted until the 1960's when a steady stream of cases
from both state and federal courts signaled a gradual movement away
from the hands-off doctrine.30 This movement was stimulated in part by
27. See Berger, Withdrawal of Rights and Due Deference: The New Hands Off Pol-
icy in Correctional Litigation, 47 UMKC L. REV. 1, 2-5 (1978) (discussing history of
hands-off doctrine in correctional litigation); Robbins, The Cry of Wolfish in the
Federal Courts: The Future of Federal Judicial Intervention in Prison Administration, 71 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 212-13 (1980) (emphasizing rationales underlying
denial of jurisdiction over prisoners' complaints and erosion of this position in
lower courts).
28. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 139
(1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21
Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871)).
29. See Fritch, Civil Rights of Federal Prison Inmates 31 (1961) (document
prepared for Federal Bureau of Prisons). Specifically, the doctrine provides that
"courts are without power to supervise prison administration or to interfere with
the ordinary prison rules or regulations." See Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A
Critique ofJudicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 506
(1963) (quoting Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 859 (1954)); see alsoJ. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.02. Professors
Gobert and Cohen stated that "[tihe hands-off doctrine was never so much a
legal doctrine as it was a shorthand way of describing the judiciary's reluctance
to become involved in the internal operations of prisons." J. GOBERT & N. Co-
HEN, supra note 5, § 1.02, at 7 (footnote omitted).
The "hands-off" courts relied on three primary rationales to support their
position of non-intervention: 1) the possibility that intervention would violate
the separation of powers doctrine; 2) judicial inexpertise regarding penology;
and 3) the fear that intervention by the courts would subvert prison discipline.
Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175,
181 (1970) (discussion and criticism of these rationales); see also Robbins, supra
note 27, at 212-13 (same). Additional rationales include the justifications that a
hands-off position promotes federalism by precluding federal intervention on
behalf of state prisoners, and that it prevents a flood of litigation. See Haas,
Judicial Politics and Correctional Reform: An Analysis of the Decline of the "Hands-Off"
Doctrine, 1977 DET. C.L. REV. 795, 797 (1977). A report from the Federal Judi-
cial Center posits that the rationale for the hands-off doctrine was that the con-
victed prisoner already had "an opportunity to exercise his 'rights' during his
day in court." FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,, RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR HAN-
DLING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: TENTATIVE RE-
PORT 2 (1976). The report suggests a second rationale that because correctional
decisions were primarily therapeutic in nature and were being fashioned to meet
rehabilitative goals, it was assumed that such decisions were not a proper subject
for judicial attention. Id.
30. See Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 29, at 183-85; see generally Note, Consti-
tutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 985 (1962) (out-
NOTE1988]
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Supreme Court decisions which scrutinized and fashioned safeguards
lining state and federal court cases reviewing prisoner complaints). Courts
initially entertained access-to-the-courts petitions. See Dowd v. United States ex
rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951) (habeas corpus proceeding appropriate where
prison warden suppressed prisoner's appeal papers pursuant to prison rules); Ex
parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941) (affirming prisoner's right of access to court
through writ of habeas corpus). Subsequently, courts expanded their jurisdic-
tion to include petitions regarding physical security and minimum conditions
necessary to sustain life. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (inmate
seriously injured by another inmate when prison officials failed to protect in-
jured inmate despite warning that attack would occur); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337 (1981) (double ceiling challenged as cruel and unusual punishment);
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (double ceiling); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.
678 (1978) (conditions of overcrowding, violence, indeterminate time spent in
isolation and deficient diet challenged).
During this period, courts also considered cases involving prisoners' civil
rights (freedoms of religion, expression and against racial discrimination, as well
as rights to privacy, to vote and to defend oneself against criminal charges). See
Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984) (denial of all contact visits and "shake-
down" searches of cells challenged as violation of fourteenth amendment and
due process rights); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (challenge regarding
"double ceiling," prohibition on receipt of hardcover books and packages sent
from outside prison, visual body cavity searches after contact visits and "shake-
down" searches of cells outside of detainees' presence); Jones v. North Carolina
Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (challenge to rule prohibiting
inmates from soliciting other inmates to join prisoners' union, to bar of all union
meetings and to officials' refusal to deliver bulk mailings of union materials);
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (prohibition of media inter-
views with specific inmates); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (same);
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (mail censorship); Cruz v. Beto, 405
U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam) (alleged refusal to allow Muslims to use prison
chapel, retaliatory punishment for sharing religious materials and prohibition on
correspondence with religious advisor challenged as violation of free exercise of
religion); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam) (alleged denial of
privileges because of religious beliefs); Rios v. Lane, 812 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir.)
(known sympathizer with militant group disciplined for exchanging information
containing militant slogans and call numbers of Spanish radio broadcasts), cert.
di.missed, 107 S. Ct. 3222 (1987); Tisdale v. Dobbs, 807 F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1986)
(prison regulation challenged as interfering with free exercise of religion);
Gometz v. Henman, 807 F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1986) (mail censorship and refusal to
send communication between jailhouse attorney and client-inmate at another
institution challenged as violation of client's access to courts); Udey v. Kastner,
805 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1986) (refusal of request for special diet as part of reli-
gious free exercise); Martin v. Kelley, 803 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1986) (challenge to
mail censorship); Vester v. Rogers, 795 F.2d 1179 (4th Cir. 1986) (challenge to
prohibition on communication between inmates at different institutions), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 3189 (1987); Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir.
1985) (prisoners challenged commissioner's refusal to deliver report containing
criticisms and complaints about facility to inmates); St. Claire v. Cuyler, 634
F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1980) (Muslim inmate challenged constitutionality of prison's
refusal to allow him to wear religious head covering and to provide guard to
escort inmate to religious services); Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (request for special diet because of religious beliefs); Sostre v. McGinnis,
334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.) (claim of religious persecution and unequal accommoda-
tion of various religions), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964); Pierce v. LaVallee,
319 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1963) (punishment because of religious beliefs), cert. de-
nied, 376 U.S. 918 (1964).
400
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against police and prosecutorial conduct that infringed upon the pre-
conviction rights of accused individuals.3 1 Specifically, the Court ad-
dressed the fourth amendment exclusion of evidence obtained in an un-
lawful search or seizure, the fifth amendment protection against self-
incrimination and the sixth amendment right to counsel.3 2 The Court,
having thus recognized a greater necessity for safeguarding the constitu-
tional rights of criminal defendants throughout the pre-conviction pe-
riod, found it inconsistent to subsequently withdraw that protection and
concern for constitutional rights because of the defendants' conviction
and incarceration. 3 3 Additionally, this movement away from the hands-
off doctrine was facilitated by the Supreme Court's expansive reading of
42 U.S.C. § 198334 in Monroe v. Pape.35 The Monroe Court ruled that
federal courts had a duty to hear claims of interference by state officials
Courts have also considered a prisoner's right to demand that he be given
the benefit of reasonable standards and procedural protections when prison offi-
cials' decisions have a significant impact on the prisoner. See Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517 (1984) (intentional, unauthorized deprivation of property chal-
lenged); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (preventive detention of juveniles
challenged as violative of due process); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983)
(confining prisoner to administrative segregation pending investigation of
prison riot challenged as violation of due process rights); Connecticut Bd. of
Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981) (prisoner alleged that pardon board's
failure to provide him with written statement of reasons for denying commuta-
tion of life sentence violated due process rights); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5
(1980) (challenge to procedural irregularities in disciplinary hearing held after
inmate confined to segregation); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (pris-
oner challenged transfer to prison with less favorable living conditions); Morris-
sey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (holding that minimum procedural standards
must be satisfied before parole could be revoked); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 59
(1972) (prisoner suit for damages to compensate for injuries and deprivation of
rights when inmate was put in solitary confinement); Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791
F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1986) (prisoner suit alleging that placement in administrative
custody violated due process rights), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3276 (1987).
31. Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 29, at 183.
32. Id.; see, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (confessions ob-
tained in violation of fifth amendment procedural safeguards inadmissible at
trial); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (confessions obtained after crim-
inal suspect requested but was refused assistance of counsel were in violation of
sixth amendment right and therefore inadmissible at trial in state court); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of fourth amendment inadmissible at trial).
33. See Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 29, at 184; see also Turner, 107 S. Ct. at
2259 ("Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the
protections of the Constitution.").
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1986). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, [or] regula-
tion ... of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law ....
Id.
35. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In Monell v. Department of Social Services, the Court
reversed on other grounds its decision in Monroe. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
1988] NOTE
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with federally protected rights.3 6 The state and federal courts used the
expansive language of this decision to consider prisoners' claims even
before the Supreme Court expressly extended the protections of section
1983 to prisoners.3 7
This gradual erosion of the hands-off doctrine thus thrust the courts
into the position of protecting prisoners' rights, a position flatly incon-
sistent with their long-standing deference to prison officials.3 8 Not only
had the courts abandoned a long-standing doctrine, but the absence of
relevant precedent provided little to guide them in this newly recog-
nized area of prisoners' rights.3 9 Because a determination of guilt cre-
ates unique constraints on individuals' exercise of fundamental rights,
the Supreme Court could not simply apply the fundamental rights analy-
sis of other contexts to the prison context. 40 While prisoners do not
possess all the rights of free citizens, they "retain[] those ... rights that
36. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174-80. The Supreme Court delineated the re-
quirements for bringing suit under section 1983 in Monroe v. Pape. Id. at 183-87.
In Monroe, 13 Chicago police invaded the Monroe home without a search war-
rant and forced the family to stand naked in the living room while the police
ransacked the house. Id. at 169. The police detained Mr. Monroe at the police
station on "open" charges for ten hours and interrogated him about a two-day
old murder. Id.
The Court held that the Monroe family had stated a cause of action against
the police officers under section 1983. Id. at 187. The Court stated that an
"[a]llegation of facts constituting a deprivation under color of state authority of
a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment satisfies to that extent the
requirement of [section 1983]." Id. at 171.
37. See Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 29, at 184. In 1964, the Court ex-
tended the protections of section 1983 to prisoners. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S.
546 (1964) (per curiam) (prisoner challenged denial of permission to purchase
religious publications and denial of privileges afforded other prisoners).
38. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 406 (1974) (noting tension be-
tween traditional hands-off policy and need to protect prisoners' rights); see also
Note, supra note 30, at 986-87 (discussing conflict between reluctance of courts
to interfere with prison management and rejection of view that prisoner is with-
out rights or remedies).
39. See Note, Prison Mail Censorship and the First Amendment, 81 YALE L.J. 87,
93-94 (1971) (in evaluating constitutionality of prison mail censorship, courts
initially employed "bewildering variety of tests" drawn from numerous first
amendment doctrines). Prior to recognizing prisoners' rights in general, the
Supreme Court heard periodic habeas corpus petitions acknowledging that pris-
oners retained the constitutional right of access to the courts. See Ex parte Hull,
312 U.S. 546 (1941) (prison regulation requiring all writs written by prisoners to
be reviewed by prison's "legal advisor" to assure that writs were in proper form
held invalid because question whether writ is properly drawn and allegations it
must contain were questions for court to determine); see also Price v. Johnston,
334 U.S. 266 (1948) (court of appeals has discretionary power to command that
prisoner be brought before it so that he may argue own appeal in case involving
life or liberty).
40. SeeJ. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 5, § 4.01, at 100-02 (noting simi-
larities and differences in prisoners' and general public's interest in expression
and noting countervailing considerations in prison context not present outside
prisons).
[Vol. 33: p. 393
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are not inconsistent with [their] status as . . . prisoner[s] or with the
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system."' 4 1
Two general formulations of the unique character of prisoners'
rights invariably appear in the Supreme Court's decisions in this regard.
The first is that "lawful incarceration brings about the necessary with-
drawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified
by the considerations underlying our penal system." '42 The second, a
converse of the first, is that an inmate "retains all the rights of an ordi-
nary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken
from him by law." 43 Thus, prisoners' rights cases require an approach
sensitive to both the nature of prisoners' rights and the constraints of
the prison environment. 44
2. Recent Supreme Court Prisoners' Rights Decisions
The Supreme Court first considered the proper standard of review
for prisoners' challenges to regulations impinging upon their first
amendment rights in Procunier v. Martinez.4 5 In Martinez, prisoners chal-
lenged mail censorship regulations which directed the mailroom staff to
censor correspondence that "unduly complained," expressed "inflam-
matory" views or beliefs, contained "defamatory" material or were
"otherwise inappropriate." '4 6 The regulations granted the mailroom
41. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). While the Pell definition is
less than precise as to the scope of prisoners' rights, prisoners do retain rights
such as access to the courts and freedom from racial discrimination to a signifi-
cant degree and rights such as freedom of religion and freedom of speech to a
lesser extent. SeeJ. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.04, at 13.
42. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948). The Price formulation of
prisoners' rights appears frequently in restrictive Supreme Court decisions.
Berger, supra note 27, at 2 n. 10 (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor
Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822
(1974)).
43. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944). Those taking an
expansive view of prisoners' rights cite this formulation of prisoners' rights. See
Berger, supra note 27, at 2 n. 10 (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor
Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 139-40 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 422-23 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring)). Professor
Berger notes that -[t]he distinction between these two [formulations] lies in the
emphasis on withdrawal of rights upon incarceration in Price, and on their reten-
tion by inmates in Coffin." Berger, supra note 27, at 2 n.10.
44. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 409-10 (1974) (Court noted
importance of environmental characteristics in determining scope of first
amendment rights); see alsoJ. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 5, § 4.01, at 101
(noting unique environmental factors present in prisons).
45. 416 U.S. 396 (1974); see U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ..... Id.; see also
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (freedom of speech is among
fundamental rights protected by fourteenth amendment from impairment by
states).
46. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 399-400 (footnote omitted). The rules promul-
gated by the Director of the California Department of Corrections provided that
1988] NOTE 403
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staff complete discretion to determine what constituted "inflammatory,"
"inappropriate" and "defamatory" material. 4 7
The Martinez Court noted the confusion reigning among the lower
courts as to the appropriate standard of review. 48 Thus, the Court
stated that it must resolve the preliminary question of what standard of
review to apply when prison regulations restrict the freedom of
speech. 49 The Court, however, did not answer this question but instead
emphasized that censorship of personal correspondence not only re-
stricted inmates' rights to free speech, but incidentally restricted the first
amendment rights of those outside the prison who wrote to the in-
mates.5 0 Having found a narrower basis of decision in the rights of out-
siders, the Court declined to consider the extent to which an individual's
personal correspondence by prisoners was "a privilege, not a right, and any vio-
lation of the rules governing mail privileges . .. may cause suspension of the
mail privileges." Id. at 399 n.l (citing Director's Rule 2401). These rules pro-
vided the sole criteria by which the mailroom staff were to censor inmate mail.
Id. at 400.
47. See id. at 400. Once a mailroom staff person decided that a letter was
objectionable, he could return it to the sender, submit a disciplinary report on
the prisoner which could result in suspension of the prisoner's mail privilege, or
place a copy of the letter in the prisoner's file to be considered in determining
work, housing assignments or parole eligibility. Id.
48. Id. at 406. The Court noted that the tension between the courts' tradi-
tional reluctance to review prisoners' complaints and the conflicting need to
protect constitutional rights resulted in a disparity of approaches to such cases.
Id. Some courts of appeals took a hands-off approach to challenges to mail cen-
sorship regulations. Id. (citing McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir.
1964); Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965); Krupnick v. Crouse, 366.
F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1966); Pope v. Daggett, 350 F.2d 296 (10th Cir. 1965)). The
Second Circuit required that censorship be "rational" and "constitutionally ac-
ceptable." Id. (quoting Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 199 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972)). The Fifth Circuit demanded that a "compel-
ling state interest" be shown to support censorship. Id. at 406-07 (quotingJack-
son v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968)). The Martinez Court also cited a
number of federal district court cases applying various intermediate levels of
review. Id. at 407.
49. Id. at 407. The Martinez Court noted the need for a uniform standard of
review in this regard, cautioning that without one prisoners' first amendment
interests received "only haphazard and inconsistent protection." Id. Similarly,
the Court noted its desire to avoid disservice to prison officials who would be
left guessing as to what was constitutionally required of them absent a uniform
standard. Id. Finally, the Court pointed to the strain on the federal courts be-
cause of the "repetitive, piecemeal litigation" encouraged by disparate stan-
dards of review. Id.
50. Id. at 408-09. Thus, the Court rejected the premise that a case such as
the one at bar involved any question of the extent of prisoners' first amendment
rights. Id. The Court reasoned that because both the sender and receiver of a
communication had an interest in the correspondence, censorship necessarily
impinges on the interests of each party. Id. at 409. The Court stated that, there-
fore, regardless of the status of a prisoner's interest in uncensored mail, the
outsider plainly had a first amendment interest whether as a sender or as a recip-
ient of mail. Id. at 408-09.
404
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free speech survives incarceration. 5 1 By expressly basing its decision
upon the incidental free speech rights of outsiders, the Court thus side-
stepped the very question it framed and was able to apply a heightened
level of scrutiny consistent with its decision in other cases. 52 Specifi-
cally, the Court held that the restriction could only be justified if prison
officials could demonstrate the regulation furthered an "important or
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of ex-
pression."' 53 Further, the Court required that the officials show that the
infringement upon free speech was no greater than necessary to further
governmental interests. 54
Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the Martinez Court
found that the vague language of the regulations encouraged prison offi-
cials and employees who censored mail to apply self-determined stan-
dards reflecting their personal prejudices and opinions.5 5 The Court
warned that prison officials could not simply use the regulations to de-
flect criticisms about the prison.56 Thus, the Martinez Court found that
the prison failed to show that the broad restrictions were in any way
necessary to further a governmental interest unrelated to the suppres-
51. Id. at 408. Robbins considered the Court's rationale and called the case
a "Pyrrhic victory, for Martinez expressly declined to rule that prisoners had any
communication rights, and instead based its holding on the outsiders' first
amendment rights .... As a result the somewhat modified hands-off doctrine
and its companion, the withdrawal of privileges doctrine, remained a serious
barrier to the expansion of prisoners' rights ..... Robbins, supra note 27, at
214 (footnote omitted).
52. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 409-10. The Court looked for guidance in cases
dealing generally with incidental restrictions on first amendment rights imposed
to further legitimate governmental activities rather than to other prisoners'
rights cases. Id. at 409. Specifically, the Court discussed two cases involving
infringements on first amendment rights in the context of state educational insti-
tutions and stressed the special environmental characteristics in each. Id. at 409-
10 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969); Healy v.James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972)). The Court also relied heavily
on United States v. O'Brien from which it adapted the standard of review that it
would apply in its analysis in the case at bar. Id. at 410-11 (citing United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
53. Id. at 413. The Court stated that prison officials could not censor pris-
oners' mail simply because it was critical of prison administration or factually
inaccurate. Id. Rather, the Court placed the burden on prison officials to
demonstrate that the censorship regulation furthered at least one of the substan-
tial governmental interests of security, order or rehabilitation. Id.
54. Id. at414-15. The Court stated that a restriction on correspondence
that furthered a substantial governmental interest nonetheless would be invalid
if it were unnecessarily broad. Id. at 414. The Court was careful to note that
latitude should be afforded prison officials in their estimation of the probable
consequences of permitting certain speech in the prison. Id.
55. Id. at 415.
56. Id. The Court found that some prison officials took advantage of the
wide latitude given them by the regulations to eliminate unwelcome criticism.
Id.
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sion of expression. 5 7
Some commentators found the Martinez decision "disappointing"
because it failed to delineate the scope of prisoners' first amendment
rights in those situations which involved the exercise of first amendment
freedoms exclusively by prisoners. 58 Two months later, however, the
Supreme Court in Pelt v. Procunier provided a general standard for pris-
oners' first amendment rights challenges. 59
In Pelt, inmates and members of the media challenged the constitu-
tionality of a regulation which forbade media interviews with specific in-
mates as a violation of their first and fourteenth amendment rights of
free speech and freedom of the press. 60 The Supreme Court balanced
the prisoners' first amendment rights against the prison's concerns of
security and related administrative matters. 6 ' The Court stated that in-
stitutional objectives promoted by the regulation and the measure of
57. Id. The prison defended the lack of guidance provided in the regula-
tion as to the meaning of terms such as "defamatory" and "otherwise inappro-
priate" by arguing that such regulations were justified by their professional
discretion. Id. at 415-16. The prison argued that censoring inmates' statements
that "magnify grievances" or "unduly complain" promoted rehabilitative goals
and prevented "flash riots." Id. at 416 (citation omitted). However, the prison
officials made no suggestion as to how such statements in prisoners' outgoing
mail could stimulate riots within the prison, nor did they demonstrate any causal
relationship between suppressing inmates' speech and rehabilitation. Id.
58. J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 5, § 4.02, at 104. The authors noted
that in situations involving only first amendment rights of prisoners, the Martinez
holding would not be controlling. Id.
59. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
60. Id. at 820-21. Specifically, three professional journalists requested per-
mission to interview inmates Spain, Bly and Guile. Id. at 820. These requests
were denied pursuant to section 415.071 of the California Department of Cor-
rections Manual which prohibited such interviews. Id. The inmates challenged
the rule as a violation of their right of free speech under the first and fourteenth
amendments. Id. at 820-21. The media plaintiffs contended that the rule im-
paired their ability to gather news and infringed their rights of freedom of the
press under the first and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 821. The media plain-
tiffs felt that the interviews they were permitted to conduct with inmates encoun-
tered at random would not produce the quality of information that could be
obtained through planned, structured interviews with specific inmates. Id. at
833. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the media's
claim, concluding that the rule effectively protected whatever rights the press
had to interview inmates because the media could still enter the prison and con-
duct interviews (even confidential ones) with inmates whom they encountered at
random notwithstanding the regulation. Id. at 821.
61. Id. at 822-28. In examining the nature of the inmates' rights, the Pell
Court noted that the constitutional right of free speech did not necessarily em-
brace a right to demand that the media listen to one's views. Id. at 821-22.
Nonetheless, the Court then proceeded to note that in some situations the right
of free speech included a right to convey one's opinions to any willing listener.
Id. at 822.
With the inmates' interest so defined, the Court weighed the prison's legiti-
mate interests in the deterrence of crime, the protective function of isolation in
quarantining offenders, rehabilitation and internal institutional security. Id. at
822-23.
406 [Vol. 33: p. 393
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judicial deference owed to prison officials in their attempts to further
those objectives were relevant in determining the validity of the
regulation. 62
In upholding the regulation, the Pell Court found the argument that
alternative means of communication were open to the inmates particu-
larly compelling. 63 The Court stated that, in light of its prior decisions
prohibiting arbitrary censorship on the basis of critical content, "written
correspondence afford[ed] inmates an open and substantially unim-
peded channel for communication with persons outside the prison in-
cluding representatives of the news media."'64 The Court also found
that the prison's visitation policy allowed contact with family, friends,
clergy and attorneys through whom inmates could communicate with
the press. 6 5 The Pell Court concluded that "[s]o long as reasonable and
effective means of communication remain open and no discrimination in
terms of content is involved," the regulation fell within the discretion of
prison officials. 6 6
62. Id. at 827. This portion of the opinion evidences the Supreme Court's
federalism concerns and its desire to afford state prison officials deference so as
not to interfere with the administration of prisons by subverting prison disci-
pline. Id. However, lest this deference be seen as a return to a hands-off policy,
the Court added the caveat that "[clourts cannot, of course, abdicate their con-
stitutional responsibility to delineate and protect fundamental liberties." Id.
63. Id. at 823-24. The Pell Court recognized that inmate interviews con-
ducted under the regulation, i.e., conducted with randomly encountered in-
mates, may be qualitatively different than planned interviews with specific
inmates, and noted that the " 'existence of other alternatives [does not] ext-
inguis[h] altogether any constitutional interest'" of the inmates. Id. at 823
(quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972)). The Court went on
to examine the alternatives available to the inmates, indicating that it would not
simply accept the proffered alternatives on their faces but would determine
whether they provided meaningful alternative avenues of communication. Id. at
823-25.
64. Id. at 824. In support of the viability of written correspondence as an
alternative means of reaching the media, the Pell Court pointed to its decision in
Procunier v. Martinez where it held that the content of inmates' correspondence
was protected from unprincipled censorship aimed at suppressing inmate griev-
ances and complaints. Id. at 824 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
416-18 (1974)). For a discussion of the Martinez case, see supra notes 45-57 and
accompanying text.
65. Pell, 417 U.S. at 824-25. The Court noted that visits were allowed with-
out regard to the possible content of the communication between the inmate
and the prospective visitor. Id. The Pell Court concluded that although it would
find the availability of such alternatives "unimpressive," if offered to justify gov-
ernmental restriction of communication among the general public, it would ac-
cept them in the situation at bar because of the close relationship between
inmates and the state officials who supervise their confinement, and because the
" 'internal problems of state prisons involve issues ...peculiarly within state
authority and expertise.' " Id. at 825-26 (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 492 (1973)).
66. Id. (quoting Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972)). The Court re-
jected the prisoners' claim that restricting their access to the media burdened
their first and fourteenth amendment right to petition the government for the
1988] NOTE 407
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The Pell and Martinez standards of review are similar in that both
require that restrictions on first amendment rights must further impor-
tant or substantial governmental interests such as security, order or re-
habilitation; both stress that the governmental interest must be
unrelated to the content of the expression; and both accord prison offi-
cials significant deference in determining what practices are needed to
further these interests. 67 However, Pell differs from Martinez in that it
does not discuss the least restrictive alternative means requirement of
Martinez; nonetheless, Pell emphasizes the availability of alternative
means of exercising the restricted right. 68
In Wolff v. McDonnell,69 the Supreme Court elaborated on and re-
fined the balancing of interests analysis applied in Pell.70 The Wolff
Court noted that, in addressing prisoners' complaints, a court must nec-
essarily confront the conflict between prisoners' residual rights and the
needs of the institution. 7 1 Thus, in any prisoners' rights case, the re-
viewing court must first decide the scope of the prisoners' retained
rights, as the Court did in Wolff. 72 Second, the court must determine the
redress of grievances. Id. at 828 n.6. The Court reasoned that prisoners had
sufficient alternative means of communicating with the press through their visi-
tors as well as through direct, confidential correspondence with any officeholder
whether in the executive, legislative or judicial branch as outlined in the state
penal code. Id. at 829 n.6.
67. SeeJ. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 5, § 4.02 (comparing Martinez and
Pell standards).
68. Id. The authors suggest that Pell does not discuss the least restrictive
alternative means requirement because prisoners' first amendment rights alone
do not warrant such a limitation. Id.
69. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
70. Id. at 555-56. The Court concluded: "In sum, there must be mutual
accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of
the Constitution .... " Id. at 556. Wolff involved challenges to three prison
regulations and practices. Id. at 542-43. Prisoners alleged that disciplinary pro-
ceedings at the prison violated due process; that the legal assistance program
was constitutionally inadequate; and that the mail regulations were unconstitu-
tionally restrictive. Id. at 543. Specifically, under the mail regulation, all incom-
ing and outgoing mail including attorney-prisoner correspondence was
inspected and read. Id. at 574. For a discussion of Pell, see supra notes 59-66
and accompanying text.
71. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556; see also Note, Prisoners' Rights, Institutional
Needs, and the Burger Court, 72 VA. L. REV. 161, 166-71 (1986) (discussing Wolfl.
In striking this balance, the Court gave deference to prison officials a major,
though not conclusive, role. Note, supra at 167. Furthermore, by refusing to
accept the regulations as mere matters of prison policy or as presumptively justi-
fied by "security needs," the Court rejected the unquestioning deference of the
"hands-off" era. Id. Finally, by modifying the remedies granted by the lower
courts, the Court showed the importance of deference in preserving federalism
and in recognizing the expertise of prison administrators. Id.
72. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555-56, 575. In reviewing the mail regulation, the
Wolff Court noted that prisoners' first amendment rights in the correspondence
context had not yet been recognized but under the rationale of Martinez, prison-
ers may be protected from censorship because of the first amendment rights of
their correspondents. Id. at 575-76 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396
408 [Vol. 33: p. 393
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nature of the government's interest asserted to justify infringing upon
the prisoners' rights. 73 Once the court has made these determinations,
it must strike a balance between these competing interests, giving weight
to the professional expertise of state corrections officials.
7
"
The Supreme Court again addressed the question of the proper
standard of review in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 75
in which the Court took a restrictive view of prisoners' retained rights. 76
The Jones Court's analysis appeared to minimally balance interests by
applying a rational basis standard of review which emphasized deference
to prison officials and the incompatibility of the exercise of certain rights
(1974)). The Court also considered the scope of prisoners' sixth and fourteenth
amendment rights allegedly infringed upon by the state's procedure of opening
attorney-inmate mail. Id. at 576. The prisoners sought to extend the protection
afforded attorney-client mail regarding criminal representation to mail related
to civil proceedings as well. Id. However, the Court concluded that the sixth
amendment only insulated the attorney-client relationship from intrusion in the
criminal setting. Id. The Court also stated that the fourteenth amendment due
process claim based on access to the courts had not been extended beyond pro-
tecting the inmate's ability to prepare a petition or complaint. Id.
In evaluating the due process claim, the Wolff Court traced its prior cases
holding that prisoners retained certain constitutional rights including religious
freedom, the right of access to the courts, protection from invidious racial dis-
crimination and protection from the deprivation of life, liberty or property with-
out due process. Id. at 556 (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 561-63. The Wolff Court considered the prison's security concern
that, without the mail regulation, contraband would be secreted in letters, even
in letters from ostensible attorneys. Id. at 577. The Court felt that the possibil-
ity that contraband would be smuggled into the prison under the guise of attor-
ney mail was a legitimate concern that justified prison officials in opening, but
not reading, even attorney-inmate mail. Id. The Court'reasoned that requiring
prison officials to check in each case whether a piece of mail was from an attor-
ney before opening it for inspection would be a nearly impossible administrative
task. Id. at 576.
Thus, the Wolff Court concluded that none of the prisoners' rights were in-
fringed upon by the mail regulation. Id. at 576-77. The Court reasoned that
since the mail would not be read, the ability to open mail in the presence of
inmates could in no way be considered censorship. Id. at 577. Nor did the
Court feel that the regulation would chill correspondence because the inmate's
presence would insure that officials would not read the mail. Id. The Court con-
cluded that the regulation might even provide more protection to the prisoner
than the constitution required. Id.
74. Id. at 568. The Wolff Court noted that it was "content... to leave the
continuing development of measures to review adverse actions affecting inmates
to the sound discretion of corrections officials" responsible for the scope of such
inquiries. Id. The Court also considered it best to defer to the officials of state
prisons because current prison practices were diverse and experimental. Id. at
569.
75. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
76. Id. The Court invoked the restrictive formulation of prisoners' rights as
set out in Price v. Johnston. For a discussion of the Price v. Johnston statement
regarding the status of prisoners' rights, see supra notes 42-43 and accompany-
ing text.
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and incarceration. 77
In Jones, prison regulations prohibited inmates from soliciting other
inmates to join a prisoners' union and banned all union meetings. 78
The inmates challenged the prison officials' efforts to prevent the opera-
tion of a prisoners' union as a violation of their first and fourteenth
amendment rights of free speech, assembly and association. 79 Prison
officials advanced security concerns in support of the restrictions.8 0
The Jones Court began its analysis by noting that the district court,
in finding for the union, "got off on the wrong foot" by not deferring to
prison officials and not recognizing the unique and restrictive environ-
mental factors of the prison setting.8 1 The Court emphasized that ab-
sent a showing that officials' concerns regarding increased tension and
disruption were unreasonable, the burden was not on the prison officials
to show affirmatively that the union would be detrimental to correctional
objectives such as security and order.8 2 Rather, the Court stated that in
the absence of substantial evidence indicating that the officials' response
was exaggerated, courts should defer to officials' professional
expertise.8 3
77. SeeJones, 433 U.S. at 125-26.
78. Id. at 122. In addition, the prison refused to deliver packets of union
publications mailed in bulk to several inmates who would then be responsible
for distributing the materials to other inmates. Id. at 122-23. These regulations
were promulgated in response to the growth and development of the union
which had been incorporated in late 1974 and had attracted approximately 2000
inmate-members by early 1975. Id. at 122. The union's stated purposes were to
promote the alteration or elimination of prison practices and policies of which it
did not approve, to form a labor union to improve working conditions in the
prison, and to serve as a vehicle for the presentation and resolution of inmate
grievances. Id.
79. Id. The inmates based their challenge to these regulations on 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1986). Id. at 121. The inmates also contended that they were deprived
of equal protection of the laws since other groups such as the Jaycees and Al-
coholics Anonymous were permitted to meet and enjoyed bulk mail and other
privileges denied the union. Id. at 122-23.
80. Id. at 126-27. Prison officials testified that an inmate union would in-
crease the existing friction between inmates and prison staff and would be a
divisive element between the union inmates and non-union inmates. Id. at 127.
Furthermore, prison officials argued that it would be subversive to the function-
ing of the prison, as it could potentially prompt work stoppages, mutinies, riots
and chaos. Id.
81. Id. at 125. The Jones Court's strong preference for deferring to the de-
cision of prison administrators is consistent with the Court's decisions in Pell and
Martinez. SeeJ. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 5, § 4.02, at 107.
82. Jones, 433 U.S. at 128.
83. Id. The Court noted that deference to the informed discretion of
prison officials permitted officials, rather than the courts, to make the compli-
cated determinations regarding institutional operations. Id.
In examining the alleged infringements, the Jones Court found that the
union members had not been denied individual mail rights, but only bulk mail
rights. Id. at 130. Thus, the Court concluded that a denial of the cost advan-
tage of bulk mailing did not fundamentally implicate free speech values. Id. at
410 [Vol. 33: p. 393
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The Court concluded that the ban on inmate solicitation and union
meetings was rationally related to the reasonable belief that concerted
group activity and solicitation would exacerbate existing problems and
create new problems and frictions in prison operations, contrary to the
central objectives of prison administration. 84 Furthermore, the Court
130-31. The Court reasoned that since other means of conveying information
were still open to the union, and since there were no first amendment considera-
tions, the bulk mail prohibition was reasonable. Id. at 131. The ban on bulk
mailing did not extend to individual union mailings sent to individual inmates.
Id. n.8. The Court noted that since the prison had disavowed any intent to inter-
fere with correspondence between individual inmates and outsiders regarding
union matters, it did not have to discuss the issues of the first amendment rights
of either outsiders or inmates. Id. (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
408-09 (1974)).
The Jones Court indicated that the solicitation of members for a prisoners'
union exceeded the scope of the inmates' first amendment free speech rights in
that solicitation involved more than the simple expression by an inmate of his
views as to the advantages or disadvantages of a union, but was an invitation to
collectively engage in a legitimately proscribed activity. Id. at 132-33. The Jones
Court emphasized that in banning inmate solicitation and organization, the
prison had foreclosed only one of several ways in which inmates could voice
their complaints to prison officials. Id. at 130 n.6. Given the existing institu-
tional grievance procedure, the Court noted that merely because the union's
grievance procedure was more desirable did not make the challenged regula-
tions unconstitutional. Id. (citing Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413; Greer v. Spock, 424
U.S. 828, 847 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)).
The Court stated that if prison officials were entitled to control union activ-
ity within the prison, then the incidental prohibition on solicitation necessary to
exert such control was not impermissible under the first amendment. Id. at 132.
As a result, the Jones Court concluded that under the facts of the case, the prohi-
bition was not only reasonable but necessary to effectuate the interests of correc-
tional officials. Id. at 132 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
Finally, the Jones Court addressed the alleged violation of the inmates' first
amendment associational rights. Id. at 132. The Court noted that numerous
associational rights were inherently inconsistent with confinement, and thus,
were necessarily curtailed. Id. Specifically, the Court noted that incarceration
restricts the freedom of an inmate to associate with others outside the prison as
well as with other inmates. Id. at 125-26. The Court stated that further curtail-
ment of associational rights was warranted whenever corrections officials deter-
mine, without conclusively being proven wrong, that such associations are likely
to interfere with order, security, rehabilitation or other legitimate penological
interests. Id. at 132. The Court reasoned that such deference was owed to pro-
fessional expertise because officials needed to be able to take preventive steps to
thwart a threat to security rather than be confined to merely reactive measures.
Id. at 132-33.
84. Id. at 129. Corrections officials testified that an inmate union would
increase the existing tension between inmates and prison personnel and be-
tween union inmates and non-union inmates. Id. at 126-27. In addition, officials
felt that an inmate union would introduce a divisive element into the population
and increase the tension caused by the seriously over-crowded conditions. Id. at
127. There was also concern that inmate-spokesmen for the union would be-
come power figures who would misuse their influence among other inmates. Id.
Prison officials expressed concern that once a union was established, even if its
activities became overtly subversive, prison administration could do nothing to
terminate its existence. Id. Officials felt the danger of work stoppages, mutinies,
19
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concluded that the regulation was drafted no more broadly than neces-
sary to prevent the threat posed by such prisoner activities.85
Two years later, in Bell v. Wofish, 8 6 the Court applied a rational rela-
tionship standard to a regulation prohibiting the receipt of hard cover
books.8 7 The Court held that the prohibition did not violate the in-
mates' first amendment rights because it imposed only a limited restric-
tion on receipt of reading materials and was rationally related to the
government's objectives.88 The Bell Court noted that the rule operated
in a neutral way without regard to the content of the expression, and
that alternative means of obtaining reading materials were not unduly
burdensome.89 The Court characterized the rule as a "reasonable time,
riots and chaos were too great to allow the establishment of a prisoner union.
Id.
85. Id. at 133. The Court seemed to develop its premise regarding the
breadth of the regulations after it reached its conclusion: "If the [prison offi-
cials'] views as to the possible detrimental effects of the organizational activities
of the Union are reasonable, as we conclude they are, then the regulations are
drafted no more broadly than they need be to meet the perceived threat ......
Id. (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412-16 (1974)).
86. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). Although this case was brought by pre-trial de-
tainees, the Court noted that its ruling was applicable to inmates at the facility as
well. See id. at 546 n.28.
87. Id. at 551. In Bell, inmates challenged a regulation that prohibited the
receipt of hard cover books unless such books were mailed directly from pub-
lishers, bookstores or book clubs as a violation of their first amendment rights.
Id. at 528, 549. In addition to the challenge to this "publisher-only" rule, "the
petition served up a veritable potpourri of complaints that implicated virtually
every facet of the institution's conditions and practices." Id. at 526-27.
In support of the "publisher-only" rule, prison officials cited security con-
cerns that contraband could be concealed in the bindings of the books and an
administrative interest in avoiding the additional staff time required to do a thor-
ough inspection of such items. Id. at 549. Officials testified that a proper search
of a hardback book would require prison staff to remove both covers and to leaf
through every page of all books to ensure that drugs, money, weapons or other
contraband were not hidden in the item. Id. Officials thus argued that such
inspections would take considerable staff time. Id.
88. Id. at 550-51. Given the ease with which contraband could be smuggled
in hardback books and the difficulty in effectively searching them, the Bell Court
reasoned that there was simply no evidence to indicate that the publisher-only
rule was an exaggerated response to legitimate security and administrative con-
cerns. Id. at 551.
Commentators suggest that the Bell Court could have taken an approach
analogous to that of Martinez and cast the case as incidentally implicating the first
amendment freedom of free world authors to have their work read by prisoners.
J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 5, § 4.02, at 108. Gobert and Cohen also
suggest that Bell implicitly rejects the Martinez view that a less restrictive alterna-
tive be considered before first amendment rights are curtailed, or at least that
the Court is retreating from its view in Martinez. Id.
89. Bell, 441 U.S. at 551. The Court noted that the restriction allowed soft-
covered books and magazines to be received from any source and hardback
books to be received from publishers, bookstores and book clubs. Id. at 552.
The Court pointed out that, while it may be more costly to obtain hardback
materials under the rule, the loss of a cost advantage did not fundamentally im-
412
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place and manner regulation" that was necessary to further the prison's
security interests. 90 In the absence of an overly broad prohibition, the
Court concluded that it should defer to the judgment of prison
officials. 9 1
The rational relationship standard and deferential posture toward
prison officials of Pell, Jones and Bell recur in later Supreme Court prison-
ers' rights decisions. 92 In Block v. Rutherford,9 3 for example, the
Supreme Court clarified the scope of judicial inquiry under Pell, stating
that, when a court finds many factors counseling against the exercise of
the right in question, the court's inquiry should end in deference to the
prison officials' expertise. 94 To continue inquiry into the balance of
plicate free speech values. Id. (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor
Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 125, 130-31 (1977)). The Court also noted that reading
materials were also available through the prison's inmate library which had ap-
proximately 8000 books and which offered newspapers and magazines for sale.
Id. & n.33.
90. Id. at 552 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115
(1972)). The Court was also influenced by the fact that the impact of the regula-
tion was limited because a detainee's maximum period of detention averaged
approximately 60 days. Id. & 524-25 n.3; see also Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S.
39, 46-48 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941).
91. Bell, 441 U.S. at 551. The Court noted that such considerations were
"peculiarly within the province" of prison officials' expertise. Id. at 547-48. The
Court also stressed the importance of deferring to prison officials because of the
serious separation of powers issues that would arise if the judicial branch of the
government attempted to run the prisons, a function of the executive and legis-
lative branches. Id. at 548.
92. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983) (because prison offi-
cials should be afforded wide latitude in adopting and implementing prison poli-
cies, officials' are only obliged to conduct informal, non-adversarial review of
inmate's confinement in "administrative segregation"); Beltran v. Smith, 458
U.S. 1303, 1305 (1982) (claims of inmate in witness protection program that
transfer to another correctional facility would reduce level of safety and security
currently enjoyed by inmate at present facility provided insufficient basis for
court to interfere with prison officials' discretion to run prison); Rhodes v. Chap-
man, 452 U.S. 337, 349 n.14 (1981) ("[A] prison's internal security is peculiarly
a matter normally left to the discretion of prison administrators.").
93. 468 U.S. 576 (1984). In Block, pretrial detainees challenged the
prison's policy of denying all contact visits and its practice of conducting ran-
dom searches of cells in the absence of the detainees. Id. at 578. The detainees
filed suit under section 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1986). Although this case does
not involve first amendment rights, it is illustrative of the Supreme Court's con-
tinuing reaffirmation of deference to prison officials even in the face of a total
ban on detainees' interests in contact visits. The Block Court applied the princi-
ples articulated in Bell v. Wolfish, a case also brought by pre-trial detainees, in
evaluating the constitutionality of conditions of pre-trial detention. Block, 468
U.S. at 584. The Block Court upheld the blanket prohibition of prison contact
visits holding that the constitution did not require contact visits when "exper-
ienced administrators have determined, in their sound discretion, that such visits
will jeopardize the security of the facility." Id. at 589.
94. See id. The Block Court faulted the district court for not ending its in-
quiry after it found numerous considerations which militated against allowing
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competing interests, warned the Court, would result in the reviewing
court substituting its view of proper prison administration for that of
prison officials. 9 5
3. Prisoners' Rights in the Courts of Appeals
Despite the foregoing Supreme Court decisions, which have con-
sistently balanced interests in a rational relationship standard emphasiz-
ing deference to the judgment of prison officials, the courts of appeals
have applied divergent standards of review.9 6 A number of circuits ap-
ply the strict scrutiny standard of Martinez despite the fact that the
Supreme Court based its opinion in that case on the incidental first
amendment rights of the inmates' correspondents. 9 7 Other circuits ap-
contact visits. Id. Despite its finding, the district court invalidated the prison's
practice of prohibiting contact visits. Id.
95. Id. The Block Court found that the district court was able to invalidate
the ban on contact visits essentially by disagreeing with prison officials and sub-
stituting its judgment for that of prison officials about the extent of the security
interests affected and the proper means to further those interests. Id. However,
the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts' conclusion and stated that
the valid, rational connection between a ban on contact visits and the prison's
interests in the internal security of the facility was too obvious to warrant ex-
tended discussion. Id. at 586. The Court agreed with prison officials that such
visits presented a security risk because contraband could be smuggled into the
prison. Id. In addition to the concern that contraband would be passed to in-
mates during a contact visit, the Block Court hypothesized that visitors might be
taken hostage and used as pawns in escape attempts. Id. at 586-87. The Court
rejected the lower court's characterization of the total ban as excessive, reason-
ing that the difficulty of conducting a contact visit program justified the ban. Id.
at 587. The Court saw difficulties in establishing even a limited contact visit pro-
gram. Id. First, the Court assumed that those detainees allowed contact visits
could become part of a conspiracy to help those denied visits to obtain weapons
and contraband. Id. The Court also recognized the substantial chances that in-
mates with propensities for violence and escape would be mistakenly approved
for visitation. Id. The Court emphasized that the brief detention periods in the
case at bar made identifying candidates for visitation even more difficult. Id.
Finally, the Court anticipated that a program allowing only select inmates to
have contact visits would breed resentment and tension and, therefore, was pre-
sumptively dangerous. Id.
96. J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 5, § 4.01, at 10 1-02.
97. Rios v. Lane, 812 F.2d 1032, 1036 (7th Cir.) (state must establish that
regulation furthers important or substantial governmental interest and that inci-
dental restriction on first amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
further governmental interests), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 3222 (1987); Martin v.
Kelley, 803 F.2d 236, 241 (6th Cir. 1986) (same); Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d
1307, 1311-13 (8th Cir. 1985) (same), affd in part and rev'd in part, 107 S. Ct.
2254 (1987); Meadows v. Hopkins, 713 F.2d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 1983) (same);
Vodicka v. Phelps, 624 F.2d 569, 570 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); Guajardo v. Estelle,
580 F.2d 748, 755 (5th Cir. 1978) (same); Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Corrections,
505 F.2d 194, 211 (8th Cir. 1974) (same); Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545,
548 (1st Cir. 1971) (same). But cf. Gometz v. Henman, 807 F.2d 113, 116 (7th
Cir. 1986) (court expressed doubt that proper standard of review is strict scru-
tiny in case regarding correspondence between inmates at different institutions);
Thorne v. Jones, 765 F.2d 1270, 1275 (5th Cir. 1985) (security decisions of
414 [Vol. 33: p. 393
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ply the Supreme Court's rational relationship standard, and thus, stress
deference to the expertise of prison officials. 98 Two other circuits have
applied their own multi-part standards that synthesize the Supreme
Court's decisions in Martinez, Pell, Jones and Bell.9 9 Finally, the Second
Circuit in Abdul Wali v. Coughlin articulated yet a fourth approach. 0 0
In Abdul Wali, the Second Circuit formulated a tripartite standard
under which the reviewing court considers: (1) the nature of the right
being asserted by the inmates; (2) the type of activity in which they seek
to engage; and (3) whether the challenged regulation merely limits or
totally abridges the exercise of the particular right. 10 ' Part one of the
prison officials are to be reviewed only for reasonableness), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1016 (1986). For a discussion of the Martinez standard, see supra notes 45-57
and accompanying text.
98. See Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335, 1342-43 (7th Cir. 1973) (stan-
dard is whether action contemplated bears rational relationship to advancement
ofjustifiable purpose of state which should be closely scrutinized so that review
is more than obeisance to officials' expertise); Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906,
911 (2d Cir.) (emphasizing that once danger is apprehended and proved, courts
should defer to discretion of officials and uphold all measures necessary to meet
threatening situation), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964).
99. The Fourth Circuit, in Vester v. Rogers, articulated a two-part standard of
review that was developed from Martinez, Pell, Jones and Bell. See Vester v. Rog-
ers, 795 F.2d 1179 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3189 (1987). The Vester
court concluded that "[i]f a penal regulation either intrudes upon the first
amendment rights of non-prisoners or constitutes a total denial of an inmate's
right to free speech, including any possible alternative means of exercising that
right, then the state must satisfy the [Martinez] strict scrutiny requirement." Id.
at 1182. The prison would have the burden of showing both a substantial state
interest and no less restrictive alternative exists to effectuate that interest. Id.
The second part of the standard applies when a regulation operates merely to
limit a prisoner's first amendment rights. Id. at 1183. In this situation, the judi-
cial deference normally accorded prison officials will, in most instances, defeat a
claim of overbreadth. Id. In Vester, the court would not consider whether the
prison had demonstrated an absence of less restrictive alternatives, but rather,
considered whether the inmate challenging the regulation had shown by sub-
stantial evidence that the prison regulation was an exaggerated response to a
valid penological objective. Id. For a discussion of Martinez, see supra notes 45-
57 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Pell, see supra notes 60-66 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of Jones, see supra notes 75-85 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of Bell, see supra notes 86-91 and accompanying
text.
The Third Circuit also developed a two-part standard. See Shabazz v.
O'Lone, 782 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987). Under this
standard, prison regulations could be upheld only if the state could prove,
"[first] that the challenged regulations were intended to serve, and do serve, the
important penological goal of security, and [second] that no reasonable method
exists by which [prisoners'] . . . rights can be accommodated without creating
bona fide security problems." Id. at 420 (footnote omitted).
100. 754 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1985).
101. Id. at 1033. InAbdul Wali, the inmates sought to receive a report con-
taining criticisms and complaints about conditions at Attica prison. Id. at 1022.
The Commissioner refused to deliver copies of the report to inmates for fear the
report would fuel disturbances and thus threaten security. Id. at 1022-23.
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standard applies where the exercise of the asserted right is held to be
inherently contrary to established penological objectives.' 0 2 If the right
does not inhere within the prison context, there can be no invasion of
the purported right, and judicial deference should be nearly absolute.10 3
Thus, the court's analysis ends if it determines that prisoners do not
retain the particular right. 10 4
The second part of the standard accords prison officials wide-rang-
ing deference in two instances. The first instance is where the exercise
of the right is presumptively dangerous, despite the fact that the restric-
tion abridges a recognized constitutional right.' 0 5 In this situation, pris-
oners bear the burden of demonstrating that there is no reasonable
justification for the regulation. 10 6 In the second instance, the reviewing
court should also afford wide-ranging deference to prison officials where
regulations merely prohibit one of a number of available means of exer-
cising protected liberties or define the time, place or manner in which a
prisoner may enjoy a right.' 0 7 In the latter instance, the court must de-
fer to official determinations regarding the regulation's necessity and
propriety, and therefore avoid the temptation to substitute its judgment
for that of experienced professionals. 10 8
Finally, the third prong of the Abdul Wali standard applies where the
activity is not presumptively dangerous and where a regulation totally
abridges rather than simply limits the exercise of a protected right. 10 9
In these limited circumstances, prison officials bear the burden of dem-
onstrating that a particular restriction is necessary to further an impor-
tant governmental interest, and that the limitations on prisoners'
retained rights are no greater than necessary to further the governmen-
102. Id. at 1033 (citingJones, 433 U.S. at 119).
103. Id. For example, the freedom to travel is completely inconsistent with
incarceration. SeeJ. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 5, § 4.02, at 102. Freedom
of association with individuals outside the prison is also completely abridged.
SeeJones, 433 U.S. at 125-26.
104. Abdul Wali, 754 F.2d at 1033. The court based this standard on the
Supreme Court's decision in Jones. Id. For a discussion of theJones standard, see
supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
105. Abdul Wali, 754 F.2d at 1033 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576
(1984)). For example, the Supreme Court found contact visits presumptively
dangerous in Block. 468 U.S. 586-87. In Abdul Wali, the court determined that
receipt of the prison report was not presumptively dangerous. 754 F.2d at 1034.
106. Abdul Wali, 754 F.2d at 1033. The Abdul Wali court drew this standard
from Block in which the Supreme Court upheld a blanket prohibition on contact.
visits. Id. For a discussion of the Block standard, see supra notes 93-95 and ac-
companying text.
107. Abdul Wali, 754 F.2d at 1033.
108. Id. The court drew this part of the standard from Bell and Pell. Id. For
a discussion of the Bell standard, see supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the Pell standard, see supra notes 59-66 and accompanying
text.
109. Abdul Wali, 754 F.2d at 1033.
416 [Vol. 33: p. 393
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This lack of uniformity among the courts of appeals prompted the
Supreme Court's most recent prisoners' rights decision in Turner v.
Safley. ''
C. Turner v. Safley
In Turner, the Supreme Court found that a less stringent standard
than strict scrutiny was appropriate in determining the constitutionality
of prison rules affecting the fundamental rights of prisoners." 12 The in-
mates in Turner challenged two prison regulations. The first regulation
permitted correspondence between immediate family members who
were inmates at different Missouri prisons and between other inmates
"concerning legal matters," but did not permit other inmate correspon-
dence unless the inmate's classification-treatment team deemed it in the
best interests of the inmate." 13 The second regulation permitted an in-
mate to marry only with the permission of the prison superintendent. 14
Permission was given only when there were "compelling reasons" for
the marriage.' 1 5 In practice, only a pregnancy or an illegitimate birth
were considered "compelling."' 16
The district court found both regulations unconstitutional.' 17 The
court applied the strict scrutiny standard articulated in Martinez and con-
cluded that the correspondence regulation was unnecessarily broad be-
110. Id. (citing Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413). For a discussion of Martinez, see
supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
111. 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
112. Id. at 2257. The Court explained that if the daily judgments of prison
officials were subject to an "inflexible strict scrutiny standard," officials' ability
"to anticipate security problems" and "to adopt innovative solutions to the in-
tractable problems of prison administration would be seriously hindered." Id. at
2262. The Court felt that such a rule would potentially subject every administra-
tive judgment to "the possibility that some court somewhere would conclude
that it had a less restrictive way of solving the problem at hand." Id. Finally, the
Court reasoned that such a rule would inevitably and unnecessarily perpetuate
the involvement of the federal courts in prison administration. Id. (citing Marti-
nez, 416 U.S. at 407). For a discussion of a strict scrutiny standard of review, see
supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
113. 107 S. Ct. at 2258. In practice, however, the effect of the regulation
was to completely prohibit correspondence between non-related inmates. Id.
The decision whether to permit inmates to correspond was based on team mem-
bers' evaluation of progress reports, conduct violations and psychological re-
ports. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. The prison adopted the challenged marriage regulation while the
mail regulation case was pending in the lower federal courts. Id. The previous
regulation regarding marriage did not obligate officials to facilitate inmate mar-
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cause prison officials could cope with security problems through less
restrictive means such as scanning suspect mail.1 18 The court also
found the marriage regulation an unconstitutional infringement of the
fundamental right to marry because it was more restrictive than reason-
ably necessary to further the state's interests in security and
rehabilitation.' 19
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the district court had prop-
erly applied the Martinez strict scrutiny standard and stated that it could
uphold the correspondence regulation only if it furthered an important
or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of ex-
pression and was no greater than necessary to protect the government's
interest.' 2 0 The court of appeals stated that inspecting prisoners' mail
would be a less restrictive means of protecting the government's interest
in maintaining institutional security. 12 ' Furthermore, the court con-
cluded that the marriage regulation could not be supported by the cor-
rectional system's asserted interests of rehabilitation and security:
rehabilitation interests could be better met through the alternative of
counseling and security concerns about violent "love triangles" were
unfounded, since rivalries were just as likely to occur with a formal mar-
riage ceremony as without one.1 22
The United States Supreme Court in Turner began its analysis by
stating its task was "to formulate a standard of review for prisoners' con-
stitutional claims that is responsive both to the 'policy of judicial re-
straint regarding prisoner complaints and [t]o the need to protect
constitutional rights.' ",123 The Court, after reviewing its prior prison-
ers' rights decisions, stated that it had not applied a standard of height-
ened scrutiny in any of its prior cases, but instead had inquired "whether
a prison regulation that burdens fundamental rights is 'reasonably re-
lated' to legitimate penological objectives, or whether it represents an
118. Id. The district court also held that the mail regulation was applied
arbitrarily and capriciously. Id. For a discussion of the standard applied in Mar-
tinez, see supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
119. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2258.
120. Id. Specifically, prison officials expressed concern that by permitting
inmate-to-inmate correspondence, the safety of inmates sent to the facility for
protective custody would bejeopardized. Id. at 2263. Officials also testified that
mail sent between institutions could be used to communicate escape plans and
to arrange assaults. Id. Finally, prison witnesses stated that prohibiting commu-
nication between inmates in combination with transferring inmates to different
institutions helped to combat the growing problems of gangs in Missouri pris-
ons. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. Barring evidence that the relationship was or would become abu-
sive, the court of appeals found the connection between an inmate's marriage
and the subsequent commission of a crime too tenuous to justify denying that
right. Id.
123. Id. (quoting Martinez, 416 U.S. at 406).
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'exaggerated response' to those concerns." 124
The Court then clarified the appropriate standard of review holding
that "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional
rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate pe-
nological interests." 125 The Court also outlined a number of factors rel-
evant in determining the reasonableness of the regulation. First, there
must be a rational connection between the prison regulation and the
legitimate governmental interest advanced to justify it. 126 The Court
elaborated that the logical connection could not be so attenuated as to
make the policy arbitrary or irrational. 12 7 The Court also stated that the
governmental objective had to be legitimate and neutral. ' 2 8 The Court
found a second consideration going to the reasonableness of the regula-
tion was the availability of alternative means by which the inmates could
exercise the right. 12 9 The Court noted that where alternative avenues
remain available for the exercise of an asserted right, courts should be
especially deferential to the professional judgment of prison officials.13 0
A third consideration discussed by the Turner Court was the impact that
accommodating the asserted constitutional right would have on other
inmates and guards and upon the allocation of prison resources. 13 1 Fi-
nally, the Court stated that the absence of alternative means for accom-
modating a prisoner's rights evidenced the reasonableness of the prison
regulation. 13 2
124. Id. at 2260-61. The Court discussed Martinez, Pell, Jones, Bell and Block
and highlighted factors that it found important in each. Id. at 2259-61.
125. Id. at 2261. Security, institutional discipline and rehabilitation are
generally considered legitimate penological objectives. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 822-
23.
126. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576,
586 (1984)).
127. Id.
128. Id. The Court stressed the importance of the regulation operating in a
neutral fashion without regard to the content of the expression. Id.; see also Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 551 (1979) (lack of content-based restriction factor in
Court's analysis); Pelt, 417 U.S. at 828 (noting so long as restriction operates
neutrally without regard to content of expression, regulation falls within appro-
priate rules and regulations to which prisoners are necessarily subject).
129. 107 S. Ct. at 2262. Simply because alternative avenues are more desir-
able than the restricted ones, this does not make the restriction unconstitutional.
See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 130 n.6
(1977). Nor is the loss of a cost advantage in the restricted means of exercising a
right a sufficient ground for invalidating a regulation. See id. at 130-31.
130. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262 (citing Pell, 417 U.S. at 827).
131. Id. The Court noted that in the closed institutional setting, few ac-
commodations will have no ramifications on the liberty of others or on the use of
the prison's limited resources for preserving order and security. Id. Courts
should defer to the discretion of prison administrators if accommodating the
prisoner's right will significantly affect other inmates or prison staff. Id.
132. Id. (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 587 (1984)). The Court
noted that the existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the
regulation is unreasonable, and an exaggerated response to prison concerns. Id.
27
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The Turner Court noted that the standard of review was not a
"'least restrictive alternative test.' ",133 If an inmate could point to an
alternative enabling him to exercise his rights at a de minimis cost to valid
penological interests, the majority stated, a court could properly con-
sider that as evidence of the reasonableness of the regulation. 134 The
Court further noted that prison officials did not have to disprove every
conceivable alternative to demonstrate the reasonableness of the regula-
tion or practice.'
3 5
Addressing the new standard to the facts of the case, the Turner
Court held that the first factor was satisfied because there existed a logi-
cal connection between the correspondence regulation and the prison's
security interest in preventing inmates from potentially using the mails
as a vehicle to communicate escape plans, to arrange assaults and other
violent acts and to facilitate prison gang activities. 136 Moreover, the
Court found that the second factor was met since the regulation did not
completely abridge the prisoner's freedom of expression, but merely
barred communication with a limited class of people with whom officials
had reasonable cause to be concerned. 137
Addressing the third factor, the Turner Court reviewed the impact
the exercise of the inmates' rights would have on other inmates and per-
133. Id.
134. Id. If an inmate can demonstrate such an alternative, this is only evi-
dence that the regulation may be an " 'exaggerated response' to prison con-
cerns." Id.
135. Id. Note that the standard of review the Turner Court outlined is
stricter than a minimum rationality, rational relationship test. See id. at 2262.
Had the Court merely applied a rational relationship standard, its analysis would
have ended when it concluded that the regulations reasonably furthered the
prison's rehabilitation and security interests. For a discussion of the rational
relationship test, see supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. However, the
Court's standard, at least on its face, required more than a "valid, rational con-
nection" between the challenged regulation and the legitimate governmental in-
terest. 107 S. Ct. at 2262 (quoting Block, 468 U.S. at 586). Three additional
factors weigh into a court's analysis under the Turner standard. By including
these factors, the Court has seemingly intensified its level of scrutiny beyond
minimum rationality to intermediate scrutiny. For a discussion of minimum ra-
tionality and intermediate scrutiny levels of review, see supra notes 21-26 and
accompanying text. For a further analysis of the Turner standard, see infra notes
158-88 and accompanying text.
136. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2226-63. The Court reasoned that communica-
tion between inmates was a "potential spur" to criminal behavior and pointed to
the fact that contact between felons is frequently prohibited even after inmates
are released on parole. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 2.40(a)(10) (1986) (federal parole
made contingent on non-association with known criminals, unless permitted by
parole officer)). The Court also noted that separating and isolating gang mem-
bers was a frequently used strategy in controlling gang activity and that this pol-
icy was logically furthered by the ban on inmate-to-inmate correspondence. Id.
(citing G. Camp & C. Camp, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Prison Gangs: Their Extent,
Nature and Impact on Prisons 64-65 (1985)).
137. Id.
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sonnel.13 8 The Court accepted the prison officials' professional opinion
that correspondence between inmates of different institutions en-
couraged the development of informal organizations which threatened
institutional safety and internal security.139 The Court concluded in this
regard that "[w]here exercise of a right requires this kind of trade-off,
we think that the choice made by corrections officials-which is, after all,
a judgment 'peculiarly within [their] province and professional exper-
tise,' should not be lightly set aside by the courts."' 140
Finally, the Turner Court considered the fourth factor and found
that no ready alternatives to the correspondence regulation were ad-
vanced by the respondent prisoners. 14 1 The Court noted that the re-
striction appeared to reasonably preserve order and security in light of
substantially similar practices utilized by other state correctional systems
and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. 14 2 The Court then rejected as inade-
quate and overly burdensome upon prison staff the prisoners' sole pro-
posed alternative of monitoring inmate correspondence for dangerous
messages. ' 4 3
After considering the prison regulation in light of the four factors,
the Court concluded that the prohibition on correspondence was rea-
sonably related to valid correctional goals, was content neutral, logically
advanced the goals of security and safety and was not an exaggerated
138. Id.
139. Id. The Supreme Court specifically noted Missouri prison officials' in-
creasing problems associated with prison gang activity. Id. The Court further
noted that the correspondence rights at issue here were very much like the orga-
nizational activities at issue in Jones, in that they could only be exercised at the
cost of significantly less liberty and safety for the other inmates and prison staff.
Id. The Court indicated that the potential for a "ripple effect" impacting other
institutions' inmates and staff would be even broader than in Jones if prisoners
were allowed to exercise their correspondence rights. Id.
140. Id. (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
141. Id. The only alternative that the prisoners suggested was that prison
officials could monitor inmate-to-inmate correspondence. Id. at 2263-64.
142. Id. at 2263.
143. Id. at 2264. The Court stated: "Prison officials testified it would be
impossible to read every piece of inmate-to-inmate correspondence." Id. The
prison never permitted inmate-to-inmate correspondence, and, therefore, it had
no idea what the volume of such mail would be but simply speculated that all
8000 inmates would write. Id. at 2272 (Stevens,J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the requisite monitoring
"clearly would impose more than a de minimis cost on the pursuit of legitimate
correctional goals." Id. at 2264. The Court concluded that it would be impossi-
ble for the mailroom staff to read every piece of inmate-to-inmate correspon-
dence, and that even if they could read every piece, there would still be a great
chance of missing dangerous messages written in jargon or code, making such a
practice impractical. Id. The Court stated that the risk of missing dangerous
communication together with the administrative burden that the monitoring in-
mate-to-inmate correspondence would impose supported the officials' judgment
that this was not a reasonable alternative. Id.
1988] NOTE
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response to security concerns. 144
The Turner Court next considered the marriage regulation.14 5 Rec-
ognizing the decision to marry as a fundamental right, ' 4 6 the Court ap-
plied the same standard of review to this regulation as it applied to the
correspondence regulation.' 47 In response to the prison administra-
144. Id. In a footnote, the Court distinguished the standard it applied in
the case at bar from the district court's. Id. at 2264 n.**. The Court stated that
the standards each court applied were not only semantically different, but the
district court erroneously applied the least restrictive alternative factor of Marti-
nez in concluding that the correspondence regulation was unnecessarily sweep-
ing. Id. (citing Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413-14). The Court dismissed the district
court's findings of fact explaining that they were based on the court's erroneous
use of a least restrictive means standard and, therefore, were largely irrelevant
for the purposes of the proper inquiry which was "whether the regulation was
reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest." Id. at n.**.
145. Id. at 2265. The regulation prohibited both marriages between in-
mates and marriages between an inmate and a civilian unless there were compel-
ling circumstances, such as a pregnancy or illegitimate birth. Id.
146. Id. (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1976) (right to marry is of
fundamental importance)); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (free-
dom to marry has long been recognized as vital personal right essential to or-
derly pursuit of happiness); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S.
535 (1942) (marriage is fundamental right).
147. 107 S. Ct. at 2266. The Court applied the same standard of review to
both regulations notwithstanding the fact that the correspondence regulation, in
effect, imposed a total prohibition on prisoners' correspondence rights while the
marriage regulation imposed a severe, albeit not total, prohibition on inmate
marriages. See id. For a discussion of the Court's refusal to use a hierarchy of
standards of review corresponding to the severity of the imposition on prison-
ers' exercise of their rights, see infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
The Court hinted that the marital regulation's burden upon inmate-civilian
marriages might support applying the Martinez standard. 107 S. Ct. at 2266.
However, the Court never directly addressed this possibility because it con-
cluded that the regulation could not withstand scrutiny even under the more
lenient reasonable relationship standard. Id. For a discussion of the Martinez
standard, see supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
The Turner Court did not indicate whether its standard was to be applied to
all fundamental rights or only to first amendment correspondence rights and to
the right to make decisions about marriage and family; however, subsequently,
the Supreme Court applied the Turner standard to a first amendment religious
free exercise claim. See O'Lone v. Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987); see also Mon-
mouth County Correctional Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 (3d Cir.
1987) (applied Turner standard to strike down regulation requiring pregnant in-
mates to obtain court-ordered release before they could receive elective, non-
therapeutic abortion as unconstitutional infringement upon right to privacy);
Howland v. Kilquist, 833 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1987) (applied Turner in reviewing
inmate's first amendment challenge to jail policy of rejecting unprivileged mail
and restricting access to hardbound legal volumes and concluded challenge was
without merit because all Turner required was reasonable relationship between
policy and government interest in security); Deer v. Carlson, 831 F.2d 1525 (9th
Cir. 1987) (applied Turner to uphold regulation prohibiting inmates from wear-
ing all headgear even religious head coverings, in dining hall as rational re-
sponse to legitimate concerns about sanitariness and discipline); Hadi v. Horn,
830 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1987) (applied Turner to uphold prison's practice of can-
celling prayer services because of scheduling conflicts or because of unavailabil-
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tion's justification of the regulation on security and rehabilitation
grounds, the Turner Court held the regulation unconstitutional on the
basis that it was not reasonably related to the penological interest of
security, but instead was an exaggerated response to this concern. 14 8
The Court concluded that there were alternative methods readily avail-
able to prison officials to accommodate the right to marry that imposed
a minimal burden on security.149
ity of Muslim chaplain and of impeding ability of inmates to obtain work releases
to attend religious service); McCabe v. Arave, 827 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1987) (ap-
plied Turner standard to uphold prison's refusal of permission to conduct group
study and worship of religion advocating racial hatred, revenge and violence as
logically related to safety and security interests; however, failure to provide stor-
age for religious literature is unconstitutional, but prison may censor literature
to excise parts advocating violence, illegal activity and inflammatory racial views
likely to incite violence); Brooks v. Andolina, 826 F.2d 1266 (3d Cir. 1987)
(court stated that Turner simply upheld regulation prohibiting inmate-to-inmate
correspondence in light of security concerns and did not support prison's action
in disciplining inmate for critical content of letter sent to outsider); Abbott v.
Meese, 824 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (applied Turner standard to regulation
restricting inmate-to-inmate correspondence but applied Martinez strict scrutiny
standard to first amendment practice of rejecting certain publications on ground
that regulation infringes rights of publishers as well as inmates' rights); Rodri-
guez v. James, 823 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1987) (applied Turner standard to uphold
regulation requiring business mail of inmates to be submitted unsealed for in-
spection and approval of any obligation of funds as reasonably related to goal of
preventing inmates from defrauding merchants or incurring excessive debt).
148. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2266. The justification advanced by the prison
officials for prohibiting both civilian-inmate and inmate-to-inmate marriages was
twofold. Id. First, prison officials were concerned about the possibility of vio-
lent "love triangles" leading to confrontations between inmates. Id. Second,
the prison administration asserted a rehabilitative justification of encouraging
self-reliance among female inmates who were abused at home or who exhibited
a detrimental overdependence on males. Id. Prison officials testified that often
this abuse or dependence was related to a woman's criminal activity. Id. Prison
Superintendent Turner cited his experience with "several ill-advised marriage
requests from female inmates" in that regard. Id. The superintendent felt that
the aim in rehabilitating these women was to foster self-reliance and indepen-
dence and that prohibiting marriage furthered this goal. Id. The Court, how-
ever, did not defer to his professional expertise. Id. The Court noted that
legitimate security concerns may require placing reasonable restrictions upon an
inmate's right to marry, and may justify requiring approval, but the restrictions
in this case were excessive. Id. The Court stated that nothing in the record
suggested that the regulation was viewed as preventing potentially violent "love
triangles." Id. The Court thus found no logical connection between the mar-
riage restriction and the formation of love triangles, reasoning that such inmate
rivalries were just as likely to occur without a formal marriage ceremony as with
one. Id.
149. Id. One such alternative was to generally permit inmate marriages,
but to reserve to prison officials the power to prohibit a marriage if officials
found that the particular marriage would pose a threat to security, order or pub-
lic safety. Id. The Court stated that nowhere in the record did prison officials
testify that such an alternative would not satisfy their security concerns. Id. The
Court indicated that the regulation which mandated refusal of a marriage re-
quest, absent a compelling reason to allow the marriage, was overly broad, espe-
cially in light of testimony that officials had experienced no problems with male
31
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Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Black-
mun, dissented in part and concurred in part, arguing that the standard
employed by the majority permitted disregard for prisoners' constitu-
tional rights. 150 Justice Stevens found "not . . .much difference" be-
tween the standard applied by the district court and the court of
appeals-whether the challenged regulation was "needlessly broad"-
and that applied by the Turner majority-whether the regulation was
"reasonably related to legitimate penological interests" and was not an
"exaggerated response" to such concerns.' 5 ' Specifically, Justice Ste-
vens stated that the majority's requirement that there merely be a "logi-
cal connection" between the regulation and some legitimate interest was
"virtually meaningless."' 5 2 Justice Stevens further condemned the ma-
jority's conclusion regarding the correspondence regulation as the
product of a "newly minted" standard of review as well as of "plainly
inmates' marriages in the past. Id. As to the rehabilitative justifications, the
Court stated that it simply could not account for the ban on inmate-civilian mar-
riages. Id. The Court emphasized that, especially in the case an inmate and a
civilian, "the decision to marry... [was] a completely private one." Id. at 2266.
Upon examination, the Court found the rehabilitative objective of fostering self-
reliance "suspect" since the over-dependency problem asserted by prison offi-
cials was a factor in only a limited number of cases. Id. at 2267. Further, the
regulation was seen as excessively paternalistic in scrutinizing the marriage re-
quests of all female inmates. Id.
150. Id. at 2267 (Stevens,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice
Stevens, however, stated that he was able to concur in the majority's invalidation
of the marriage regulation because this result did not require rejection of a stan-
dard of review more demanding than the one articulated by the majority. Id. at
2268 (Stevens,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). For a discussion of the
standard articulated by the Turner majority, see i~ifra notes 159-88 and accompa-
nying text.
151. 107 S. Ct. at 2267 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Justice Stevens commented that determining the "proper" standard of review in
such a case would not magically make the Court's task of deciding the case any
easier. Id. at 2268 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice
Stevens remarked: "How a court describes its standard of review when a prison
regulation infringes fundamental constitutional rights often has far less conse-
quence for the inmates than the actual showing that the court demands of the
State in order to uphold the regulation. This case provides a prime example."
Id. at 2267 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Stevens
fully agreed with the lower courts' conclusion that the total ban on inmate-to-
inmate correspondence violated the first amendment given no showing by
prison officials that they could not anticipate and avoid any security problems
that may arise from allowing such correspondence. Id. at 2270 (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part).
152. Id. at 2267 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice
Stevens stated:
Application of the standard would seem to permit disregard for in-
mates' constitutional rights whenever the imagination of the warden
produces a plausible security concern and a deferential trial court is
able to discern a logical connection between that concern and the chal-
lenged regulation. Indeed, there is a logical connection between
prison discipline and the use of bullwhips on prisoners ....
Id. at 2267-68 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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improper ... encroachment into the fact-finding domain of the District
Court." 153
Justice Stevens found the majority's treatment of each regulation
under the standard "striking and puzzling." 154 While the majority
found that inmates were not totally deprived of all means of expression
under the correspondence regulation, the dissent considered this irrele-
vant to the issue of whether the restrictions enforced were unnecessarily
broad. 155 Justice Stevens reasoned that if the majority had applied the
same rationale to the marriage regulation, i.e., that the regulation did
not totally prevent inmates from marrying, as it had to the correspon-
dence regulation, then the majority would have been forced to uphold
the marriage regulation on the basis that it could have been even more
restrictive. 156 Justice Stevens likewise rejected the majority's contention
that it would be impossible for officials to scan inmate-to-inmate corre-
spondence, finding the evidence in the record insufficient to support
153. Id. at 2268 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing
Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709 (1986)). Justice Stevens ac-
cused the majority of factfinding and sifting the testimony to uphold the corre-
spondence regulation. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Specifically, Justice Stevens pointed out that the majority cited both the trial
transcript and the amicus curiae brief of the state of Texas, but selectively ignored
the district court's findings of fact. Id. at 2268 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). Under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, the Turner Court was bound by all of the district court's findings since they
were not clearly' erroneous. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). Nevertheless, Justice Stevens noted, the majority relied on the district
court's finding that the marriage regulation was excessively paternalistic but re-
jected the court's findings regarding the correspondence regulation which were
not clearly erroneous. Id. at 2274 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). Similarly, in the marriage context, the majority rejected expert specula-
tion about security problems associated with "love triangles," yet in the corre-
spondence context, expert speculation about "potential gang problems" and the
possible use of codes and jargon received "virtually total deference." Id. (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Stevens also noted that
"while the Court correctly dismisses as a defense to the marriage rule the specu-
lation that the inmate's spouse, once released from incarceration, would attempt
to aid the inmate in escaping, the Court grants virtually total credence to similar
speculation about escape plans concealed in letters" from one inmate to an-
other. Id. (Stevens,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
154. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (footnote omit-
ted). The dissent noted:
The Court's bifurcated treatment of the mail and marriage regulations
leads to the absurd result that an inmate at [the prison] may marry an-
other inmate, but may not carry on the courtship leading to the mar-
riage by corresponding with him or her beforehand because he or she
would not then be an "immediate family member."
Id. at 2274 n.15 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
155. Id. at 2272 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The
fact that an inmate could correspond with friends who are not incarcerated does
not make the regulation less than a total ban on correspondence between in-
mates and as such is irrelevant to the question whether the restrictions were
unnecessarily broad. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
156. Id. at 2272 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
1988] NOTE 425
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such a finding of impossibility.15 7 As a result, Justice Stevens called the
regulation a "blanket prohibition" and an " 'excessive response' " to
any legitimate security concern.1 58
III. ANALYSIS
It is submitted that the Supreme Court's "newly minted" standard
is hardly new. 159 The Turner majority said as much when it stated that
Pell, Jones and Bell had probably already determined the proper standard
of review for prisoners' rights. ' 60 In fact, the Court made the same ra-
tional relationship test it had applied in those prior cases a factor in the
Turner standard, and merely supplemented the analysis by outlining
three other factors courts should consider in determining the constitu-
tionality of a challenged prison regulation. 16 1
157. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Stevens
stated: "No such finding of impossibility was made by the District Court, nor
would it be supported by any of the findings that it did make." Id. (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). In support, Justice Stevens quoted a dis-
trict court finding, ignored by the majority, that the staff at the prison had been
able to scan and control outgoing and incoming mail, including inmate-to-in-
mate correspondence. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Justice Stevens also noted that the majority's speculation about prisoners com-
municating in codes was unsupported by record evidence and was based on a
suggestion in an amicus curiae brief. Id. at 2271 n.13 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
158. Id. at 2273 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice
Stevens concluded that the prisoners' correspondence rights should have re-
ceived constitutional protection. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). In support of his conclusion, Justice Stevens indicated that the record
contradicted the majority's conclusion that scanning inmate-to-inmate mail
would be unbearable. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Furthermore, the ban was an excessive response to security concerns and was
contrary to a consensus of expert testimony that Justice Stevens suggested was
"far more reliable than the speculation to which this Court accords deference."
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
159. Id. at 2268 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The
Turner Court specifically cited its previous prisoners' rights cases as the origins
of the four factors it assembled in its analysis. Id. at 2262 (citing Block v. Ruth-
erford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979);Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977); Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817 (1974)). For a discussion of Pell, see supra notes 59-66 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of Bell, see supra notes 86-91 and accompanying
text. For a discussion ofJones, see supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text. For
a discussion of Block, see supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of the four factors applied by the Turner majority in its analysis, see supra
notes 125-44 and accompanying text.
160. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2261.
161. Id. at 2261-62. The Court stated that a reasonableness standard was
necessary if prison administrators and not courts were to make the difficult deci-
sions regarding prison operations. Id. at 2262 (citingJones, 433 U.S. at 128).
Basically, the elements of the reasonableness standard in Turner are the same
considerations that once constituted unique factors in the analysis of prior cases.
See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119
[Vol. 33: p. 393
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It is submitted that a single reasonableness standard, even one such
as that articulated in Turner, is inadequate to protect prisoners' constitu-
tional rights. 16 2 Two problems in the application of such a standard
preclude meaningful review.
First, as Justice Brennan stated in O'Lone v. Shabazz, 163 the standard
is "categorically deferential."'164 Thus, after Turner, it appears that
whenever a reviewing court finds a logical connection between a prison
official's plausible security concern and the challenged regulation, the
regulation will be sustained absent overwhelming evidence of its unrea-
sonableness. 165 Institutional security, discipline and rehabilitation can
(1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). For a discussion of these cases
and the contribution each made to the factors the Court considered in Turner,
see supra notes 59-91 and accompanying text.
162. The foundation of the Turner Court's standard was a rational relation-
ship test. See id. at 2261. The majority seemingly elevated its standard to an
intermediate level of scrutiny by outlining three additional factors which to-
gether, on their face at least, indicated that courts were to truly scrutinize chal-
lenged regulations. Subsequently, however, the Turner Court watered down the
standard through the way in which the majority applied it. For a discussion of
the four factors of the Court's analysis, see supra notes 125-32 and accompany-
ing text. For a criticism of the way in which the Turner Court's factors are ap-
plied, see infra notes 159-88 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
intermediate and minimal levels of scrutiny, see supra notes 21-26 and accompa-
nying text.
Furthermore, it is submitted that the Turner Court's use of a single standard
of review for all fundamental rights challenges does not adequately take into
account the degree of deprivation imposed by a regulation. For a discussion of
an alternative standard of review which does take cognizance of the degree of
deprivation incident to a regulation, see infra notes 189-205 and accompanying
text.
163. 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987).
164. Id. at 2408 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of why the Tur-
ner standard is categorically deferential to prison officials, see infra notes 165-69
and accompanying text.
In O'Lone, Muslim inmates challenged two prison policies which had the in-
cidental effect of preventing them from attending Jumu'ah, the primary congre-
gational service of their faith. Id. at 2402. The O'Lone Court applied the Turner
standard and concluded that the regulations did not offend the inmates' interest
in the free exercise of religion despite the fact that the regulation effectively
precluded a subgroup of Muslims from attending the religious service held every
Friday. Id. at 2407 (citing Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2263).
165. 107 S. Ct. at 2267-68 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). For example, the Turner Court accepted speculation by prison officials
that allowing correspondence between inmates would lead to gang problems,
escapes and the use of secret codes in support of the ban on inmate correspon-
dence. Id. at 2263. The Superintendent, however, was unable to offer proof
that the total ban on inmate correspondence inhibited escape plots, inmate riots
or other subversive activities. Id. at 2270 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part). Nonetheless, this lack of proof was not fatal to the prison's
case. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also OLone,
107 S. Ct. 2400 (prison policies rescheduling certain Muslim inmates to outside
work detail and refusing to allow these inmates to return to their buildings up-
held despite fact that policies deprived inmates of opportunity to participate in
weekly, central religious service of their faith and notwithstanding prison's his-
19881 NOTE 427
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easily be cited in support of virtually any regulation and unless there is
some strong evidence to suggest that the governmental interest is not
legitimate, the court is unlikely to look beyond the face of the stated
interest to see if the underlying policy is arbitrary or irrational or if the
regulation truly furthers those interests. 16 6
The reviewing court will also defer to prison officials if another ave-
nue of exercising the right remains open to the inmates. 167 Under the
Court's standard, when accommodating a prisoner's right will affect fel-
low inmates or prison staff, courts are directed to be particularly defer-
ential to prison officials. 168 Finally, the absence of ready alternatives is
merely evidence of the reasonableness of the regulation and unless pris-
oners can demonstrate an alternative that fully accommodates the right,
the court will not inquire further.' 69
tory of accommodating Muslim inmates prior to adoption of these policies);
Deer v. Carlson, 831 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1987) (prison officials' opinion that
inspection of headgear would lead to confrontations between inmates and per-
sonnel provided sufficient basis for court to conclude prohibition of all headgear
in dining hall, even headgear worn for religious reasons, did not violate inmates'
constitutional right to free exercise of religion); Howland v. Kilquist, 833 F.2d
639 (7th Cir. 1987) (prison official's assertion regarding security concerns was
sufficient to uphold policy of rejecting unprivileged mail and restricting inmate's
access to hardbound legal volumes under Turner standard); Hadi v. Horn, 830
F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1987) (prison officials' concerns that if Muslim inmates were
allowed to lead congregational service, security might be jeopardized due to
possible doctrinal conflicts or use of meetings to coordinate subversive activity
are legitimate and support practice of canceling prayer services when Muslim
chaplain was unavailable).
166. See Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2267-68 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part). Even though Superintendent Turner testified that it would be
possible to screen the mail of inmates suspected of gang activities, the Court did
not consider this as evidence that the total ban was an exaggerated response. Id.
at 2270 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also OLone,
107 S. Ct. at 2411-12 (OLone majority deferred to prison officials' mere asser-
tions that accommodating inmates' wishes to attend religious services was not
feasible despite evidence that inmate participation was compatible with the con-
cerns of prison administration and that prison previously had accommodated
Muslim inmates over period of five years without incident).
167. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262. It is suggested by the Turner decision that
this alternative avenue of expression need not necessarily be a meaningful one.
See id. at 2272 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). For example,
the Turner majority implied that the ability of a prisoner to write to friends not in
prison provided an adequate, substitute means of expression given the prohibi-
tion against writing other inmates. See id. at 2263.
168. Id. at 2262. The Turner Court itself noted that this consideration was
but a straw man when it pointed out that, "[iun the necessarily closed environ-
ment of the correctional institution, few changes will have no ramification on the
liberty of others or on the use of the prison's limited resources." Id. It is the
rare situation where accommodating a prisoner's right will not somehow impact
others in a system possessing finite resources. It is submitted that this factor
adds little to the degree of scrutiny courts will apply under this reasonableness
standard.
169. Id. Prison officials do not bear the burden of proving that alternative
methods of accommodating prisoners' constitutional rights are unworkable. Id.
428 [Vol. 33: p. 393
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It is submitted that the excessive role of deference in the Turner
Court's reasonableness standard reduces the arguably intermediate
standard of review to that of a rational relationship standard' 70 afford-
ing minimal scrutiny of challenged regulations which is reminiscent of
the Supreme Court's earlier hands-off approach to prisoners' com-
plaints.'17 However, it is also submitted that a minimal amount of scru-
tiny is not necessarily inappropriate in all cases. Sometimes, courts
should defer to the judgment of prison administrators. One instance is
when a regulation precludes the inmates from engaging in a presump-
tively dangerous activity.1 72 Here, deference should be nearly absolute,
but not categorical.' 7 3 Another instance is when prison regulations
work limited deprivations on prisoners' rights by merely restricting the
means, time, place or manner of the exercise of a right.' 74 Here, defer-
ence should be wide-ranging.1 75
It is submitted that there exists a third instance in which deference
is inappropriate and "professional judgment must ... yield to constitu-
tional mandate."1 76 This situation arises where the activity involved is
not presumptively dangerous, and a regulation effectively deprives,
Rather, the burden is on the prisoner: "But if an inmate ... can point to an
alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's ights at de minimis cost to
valid penological interests, a court may consider that as evidence that the regula-
tion does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard." Id.
170. For a discussion of why the Turner standard as outlined resembles an
intermediate level of scrutiny, see supra note 135 and accompanying text.
171. Whereas before, under the hands-off doctrine, courts failed to protect
prisoners' rights by refusing jurisdiction over their complaints, under the new-
hands-on-but-highly-deferential doctrine, courts fail to protect prisoners' rights
by declining to engage in meaningful review of their complaints. Berger, supra
note 27, at 20. In his article, Professor Berger states:
Rather than justifying the denial of jurisdiction in prisoners' rights
cases, however, the Court now accepts jurisdiction but uses due defer-
ence as a principle upon which to base its affirmance of the correctional
administrators' decision.
The result is a policy of deference dramatically different from the
normal respect accorded by the courts to administrative agency deter-
minations. The Supreme Court's effective stance has been not only a
reluctance to reverse administrative decisions, but rather the grant of
virtually unreviewable discretion to correctional officials on questions
involving the constitutional rights of inmates.
Id. (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of the hands-off approach to prisoners'
complaints, see supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
172. See Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1033 (2d Cir. 1985).
173. Id. For a discussion of the first branch of the Abdul Wali standard, see
supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
174. Abdul Wali, 754 F.2d at 1033.
175. Id. For a discussion of the second branch of the Abdul Wali standard,
see supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
176. Abdul Wall, 754 F.2d at 1033.
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rather than limits, the exercise of a prisoner's rights. '77 The standard as
enumerated by the Turner Court, however, would be applied uniformly
to these very different instances and thus a major flaw of the standard is
its failure to discriminate among degrees of deprivation. 17 8 The Court
will apply the same standard whether a regulation, in effect, totally de-
nies the exercise of a fundamental right or merely restricts its exer-
cise.' 79 For example, the Turner standard of review would apply
uniformly to a regulation that restricts use of a prison library to certain
hours as well as one that prevents inmates from reading at all.' 8 0
Although the Court's standard indirectly addresses the degree of depri-
vation by considering available alternatives, counsel and the judiciary
will be unlikely to accord this factor the importance it would otherwise
receive under a heightened scrutiny analysis.' 8 '
Likewise, the absence of ready alternatives to accommodate prison-
ers' rights is a factor in the reasonableness analysis rather than a basis
177. Id. For a discussion of the third branch of the Abdul Wali standard, see
supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
178. See Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2261 (categorizing regulations as imposing
mere time, place or manner restrictions or as limiting presumptively dangerous
activities is simply conclusion about reasonableness of regulation in relation to
proffered security concerns and as such is "tenuous basis for creating a hierar-
chy of standards of review."); O'Lone, 107 S. Ct. at 2404 n.** (rejecting conten-
tion that heightened scrutiny is warranted when regulation prohibits, rather than
merely limits, exercise of constitutional right); see also Monmouth County Cor-
rectional Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 333 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Tur-
ner, 107 S. Ct. at 2261; OLone, 107 S. Ct. at 2404 n.**) ("[T]he Supreme Court
has recently instructed that, whether the restriction be partial or complete, a
reviewing court must apply a uniform standard of review.").
179. See OLone, 107 S. Ct. at 2404 n.**. Justice Brennan criticized the use
of a single standard for all prisoner challenges and noted that to the extent that
incarceration is intended to inculcate a respect for social and legal norms, a re-
quirement that prison officials demonstrate the need for total deprivations of
prisoners' rights would be consistent with this end. Id. at 2409-10 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
180. Id. at 2408 (Brennan,J., dissenting). In Turner, for instance, the Court
applied the reasonableness standard to the total ban on inmate-to-inmate corre-
spondence as well as to a regulation that severely restricted inmate marriages
but did not totally ban them. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262-63. For a discussion of
Turner, see supra notes 111-58 and accompanying text.
181. OLone, 107 S. Ct. at 2408-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Bren-
nan noted that by employing different levels of scrutiny, courts signal that when
fundamental rights, interests or suspect classes are involved, official power must
justify itself in a way that otherwise it need not. Id. at 2409 (Brennan,J., dissent-
ing). Justice Brennan also commented that "[a] relatively strict standard of re-
view is a signal that a decree prohibiting a political demonstration on the basis of
the participants' political beliefs is of more serious concern, and therefore will
be scrutinized more closely, than a rule limiting the number of demonstrations
that may take place downtown at noon." Id. at 2409 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
As it stands this consideration is an "elastic" and easily satisfied factor effectively
providing scrutiny only in situations of total deprivation of fundamental rights.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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for applying heightened scrutiny. 18 2 Thus, the absence of alternatives is
merely evidence of the reasonableness of a regulation. 18 3 Here, the
burden is on the inmate to demonstrate an alternative that fully accom-
modates the right in question at a de minimis expense to governmental
interests.' 8 4 However, as to prison regulations, the very same individu-
als who make the rules possess the evidence essential to showing the
superiority of a given deprivation over other alternatives. ' 8 5 It is there-
fore submitted that inmates themselves have little chance of suggesting
an alternative that could withstand the presumption of validity that ac-
companies a court's deference to prison officials' professional determi-
nation that the alternative would impose more than a de minimis cost. '
8 6
Placing the burden on the inmates, therefore, virtually ensures their fail-
ure, especially since almost any change in the established method of op-
erating to accommodate the right will be at some cost to governmental
interests. 187
182. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262.
183. Id. Conversely, the existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be evi-
dence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an exaggerated response to
security concerns. Id.
184. Id.
185. O'Lone, 107 S. Ct. at 2410 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
stated that it was only fair that prison officials be held to a stringent standard of
review in such cases. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
186. See Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262. The Turner Court noted that where ac-
commodation of a prisoner's right would have a significant "ripple effect" on
other inmates and prison staff, courts should be especially deferential. Id. As
noted above, virtually any accommodation of prisoners' rights will impact upon
the liberty and safety of other inmates and corrections personnel and may have
an effect felt throughout other prisons as in the case of inmate-to-inmate corre-
spondence. See OLone 107 S. Ct. at 2412-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a
discussion of the potential for a "ripple effect" amongst multiple correctional
institutions, see supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
187. This consideration ties into that part of the Turner Court's analysis re-
garding the impact that accommodation of the constitutional right will have on
prison resources. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262. Notably, once a change is shown to
be at some cost, in staff time, for example, it will defeat both the requirement of
a de minimis cost and the requirement that the accommodation not burden prison
resources. See OLone, 107 S. Ct. at 2406-07, 2411-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2263-64, 2272-73 (Stevens,J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part); see also Deer v. Carlson, 831 F.2d 1525, 1529 (9th Cir. 1987) (despite
concession that suggested inspection would have de minimis effect on staff and
would alleviate officials' legitimate safety concern, alternative was rejected on
speculation that inspection might cause confrontations between guards and pris-
oners). It appears that to the extent that any accommodation will require some
reallocation of finite resources, the prison necessarily will prevail. O'Lone, 107 S.
Ct. at 2412-13 (Brennan,J., dissenting); see also Hadi v. Horn, 830 F.2d 779, 786
(7th Cir. 1987) (if prison allowed Muslim inmates to lead religious services, priv-
ilege would have to be extended to other religions thus compounding security
problems and increasing concomitant demands on staff). But see Monmouth
County Correctional Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 341 (3d Cir. 1987)
(funding nontherapeutic abortions and transporting and escorting pregnant in-
mates to medical facility does not burden prison's finite resources any more than
current practice of providing inmates with all necessary pre- and post-natal
1988] NOTE
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The Turner Court's excessively deferential reasonableness standard
provides the barest scrutiny of restrictions upon prisoners' rights and
essentially validates officials' action on the basis of assertions regarding
possible administrative and security problems rather than on the basis of
any proof that the regulations are necessary to further governmental
interests. 188
It is suggested that prisoners' rights would be better protected, es-
pecially where the practical effect of a regulation is a total or nearly total
abridgement of rights, under a standard such as that outlined by the
Second Circuit in Abdul Wali v. Coughlin.18 9 Under the Abdul Wali stan-
dard, analysis proceeds along one of three branches depending on the
nature of the right being asserted by prisoners, the type of activity in
which they seek to engage and whether the challenged regulation merely
limits or totally abridges the exercise of the particular rights.190 A large
percentage of challenges to prison regulations will fall under the first
care). This accommodation will divert resources from other penological objec-
tives in which case the courts are directed to defer to officials' expertise as to the
most efficient use of these resources. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262; see also McCabe
v. Arave, 827 F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 1987) (prison officials' determination that
allowing group religious activities by close-custody inmates would burden
prison resources and increase security risk is entitled to respect and deference).
188. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2268 n.l (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part).
189. 754 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1985). Justice Stevens cited with approval the
standard applied by the Second Circuit in Abdul Wali v. Coughlin. Turner, 107 S.
Ct. at 2268 n. I (Stevens,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Bren-
nan also endorsed the Abdul Wali standard in OLone v. Shabazz. Id. at 2409 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the Abdul Wali standard, see supra notes
100-10 and accompanying text and infra notes 190-204 and accompanying text.
190. Abdul Wali, 754 F.2d at 1033. The first branch of the standard ad-
dresses rights that are inherently inconsistent with incarceration and, therefore,
are not retained by prisoners. Id. Under these circumstances, no right exists to
be infringed and judicial deference should be nearly absolute. Id.
The second branch of the standard applies in three situations: (1) when the
exercise of the retained right is presumptively dangerous; (2) when prison regu-
lations merely define the time, place or manner in which a right may be exer-
cised; and (3) when regulations limit one of the available means of enjoying a
right. Id. In cases falling under the second branch, a court must afford officials
wide-ranging deference. Id.
The third branch operates where the activity is not presumptively danger-
ous and the regulation totally abridges rather than simply limits the exercise of a
fundamental right. Id. In this situation, prison officials must prove that the reg-
ulation furthers an important government interest and that it infringes no more
than is necessary to further the governmental interest. Id.
In contrast, the Turner standard applies uniformly without regard to whether
the regulation totally abridges or merely limits the exercise of a fundamental
right. See Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262. For a discussion of the uniform use of the
Turner standard, see supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text. For a fuller dis-
cussion of the Abdul Wali standard, see supra notes 100-10 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the third prong of the Abdul Wali standard, see infra
notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
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two branches of the standard 19 1 and are not a significant departure from
the Turner Court's deferential standard. 19 2 However, analysis under the
third branch of the Abdul Wali standard differs fundamentally from the
Turner analysis in four significant respects that together provide greater
protection for prisoners' constitutional rights. 193
191. For a discussion of the first two branches of the Abdul Wali standard,
see supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
192. OLone, 107 S. Ct. at 2409 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is submitted
that, although the analysis under the Abdul Wali and Turner standards of review
are somewhat different, the predominant role deference plays in each reduces
the standards to a common denominator-essentially, a reasonableness stan-
dard of review-for cases falling within branches one and two of the Abdul Wali
standard. See id. at 2409 (Brennan, J., dissenting). To illustrate the similarity of
these standards under branch one, assume an inmate, desirous of attending a
special religious ceremony held outside the prison, challenged the prison's prac-
tice of not allowing prisoners to leave the facility except for court appearances
and medical emergencies. Under an Abdul Wali analysis, once the reviewing
court determined that the right to travel and move about from place to place did
not inhere within the prison context, its analysis would end in nearly absolute
deference to the prison officials. See Abdul Wali, 754 F.2d at 1033. In contrast,
under Turner the reviewing court would determine whether there was a valid
rational connection between the practice of only allowing inmates out of the
prison for court appearance and medical emergencies and the security and
safety concerns that an inmate might escape from his escorts and endanger the
public. See Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262. The court being particularly deferential to
prison officials would then consider whether alternative means of exercising reli-
gious rights existed within the prison and the significant impact accommodating
the inmate would have on inmates not allowed to leave and on the prison re-
sources that would be expended in escorting the inmate. See id. Finally, the
court would consider whether the inmate could show that this alternative accom-
modation would impose more than a de minimis cost. See id.
Similarly, the second branch of the Abdul Wali standard does not differ sig-
nificantly from the Turner standard. Assume for comparison of the two stan-
dards that the inmate wishes to attend a unique Native American religious
ceremony held in an area of the prison that is less secure than the unit in which
the inmate is housed. See Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1987)
(involving such ceremony). Assume further that the service involves the use of
an axe to chop wood for a fire, red hot stones to heat a special room in which the
ceremony is conducted and a pitchfork to carry the hot stones from the fire into
the room. Id. Prison officials assert security concerns in allowing these maxi-
mum security inmates to take part in the ceremony. Id. at 566-67. In such a
situation, the underlying fundamental right-the free exercise of religion-in
itself, is not presumptively dangerous; however, the particular expression of that
right is. Under the Abdul Wali standard, once the reviewing court determined
that allowing maximum security inmates to participate in the religious ceremony
was presumptively dangerous, the court would grant officials wide latitude. That
the inmates are precluded this exercise of their fundamental right does not affect
the result. Similarly, under the Turner standard, the court would uphold the pro-
hibition through application of the four factors heavily emphasizing deference to
prison officials. See Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262.
Thus, in these types of cases, like the Turner standard, the Abdul Wali stan-
dard acknowledges that in many cases it is inappropriate for the court to substi-
tute its judgment for that of prison officials. OLone, 107 S. Ct. at 2409
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
193. The third branch of the Abdul Wali standard applies when the activity
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The first significant difference between the standards is that under
Abdul Wali if a court finds that the challenged regulation effectively
"works a total deprivation (as opposed to a mere limitation) on the exer-
cise of [a] right" the exercise of which is not presumptively dangerous,
this triggers a higher degree of judicial scrutiny with a necessarily re-
duced emphasis on deference. 194 Contrast the Turner standard under
which the degree of deprivation is merely another factor in the overall
reasonableness analysis rather than a basis for applying heightened scru-
tiny. 19 5 Furthermore, as shown by the Turner majority's analysis of the
correspondence regulation, deference to officials regarding the availa-
bility of alternative means of exercising the right can obscure the inade-
quacy of available alternatives.' 96
The second point of contrast is upon who bears the burden of
proof. Under the Abdul Wali standard, prison officials bear the burden of
showing that the regulation furthered an important governmental inter-
est and that the regulation infringes no more than is necessary to further
that interest. 19 7 In Turner, however, inmates bear the burden of proving
the unreasonableness of the regulation. Even if an inmate is able to sug-
gest an alternative that accommodates the right, this is merely evidence
that the regulation is unreasonable.' 98
The third difference is that under Abdul Wali prison officials must
actually show that the challenged regulation furthers an important, legit-
imate interest in security, discipline or rehabilitation. 19 9 The Turner
standard requires far less: the court need only find a "logical" or "valid,
rational connection" between the regulation and the government inter-
est.2 00 As Justice Stevens poignantly noted: "Indeed, there is a logical
connection between prison discipline and the use of bullwhips on
prisoners."°2 0 '
The final difference is that the Abdul Wali standard requires prison
officials to show that the regulation imposes no greater restriction on
the exercise of a right than is necessary to further the governmental in-
in which the inmate seeks to engage is not presumptively dangerous and the
regulation on its face, or in effect, totally abridges the exercise of a fundamental
right. Abdul Wali, 754 F.2d at 1033.
194. See id.
195. See Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262.
196. See id. at 2263-64. For a criticism of the Turner Court's analysis of
available alternatives, see supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
197. See Abdul Wali, 754 F.2d at 1033.
198. See Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262; see also OLone, 107 S. Ct. at 2412-14(inmates' suggestions demonstrating arguably workable ways to allow them to
attend religious service not sufficient to support finding regulation
unreasonable).
199. See Abdul Wali, 754 F.2d at 1033.
200. See Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S.
576, 586 (1984)).
201. Id. at 2268 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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terest.2 02 Turner only considers the existence of "easy alternatives" as
evidence that the regulation is unreasonable.2 0 3
These differences, it is submitted, are not insignificant, but greatly
impact the likelihood of a successful challenge to a prison regulation.
Furthermore, while both the Abdul Wali and Turner standards, on their
face, are couched in language and factors seemingly indicating interme-
diate levels of scrutiny, the Abdul Wali standard more consistently and
more predictably provides protection of prisoners' rights. It is submit-
ted that the heavy emphasis on deference in the Turner standard makes
the factors so malleable that in the hands of one court the chameleon-
like standard will operate like a rational basis test, while in the hands of
another court it will operate like an intermediate level of review depend-
ing on the nature of the right asserted, the type of activity in which the
inmates seek to engage and the degree of deprivation 2 04 -factors pre-
dictably built into the three branches of the Abdul Wali standard. There-
fore, it is submitted that only the Abdul Wali standard consistently and
predictably provides meaningful constitutional review over the exercise
202. See Abdul Wali, 754 F.2d at 1033.
203. See Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262.
204. Arguably, the Supreme Court's application of the Turner standard to
the correspondence regulation, was not wholly consistent, and less stringent
than the Court's application of the standard to the marriage regulation. See id. at
2274 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). For a criticism of the.
majority's inconsistent application of the standard, see supra notes 154-58 and
accompanying text.
The ways in which the Courts of Appeals have applied the Turner standard
further illustrate how the standard can be manipulated to achieve levels of re-
view between minimum rationality and intermediate scrutiny. Compare Martin v.
Brewer, 830 F.2d 76, 78 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Turner, but upholding regulation
requiring attorneys to stamp mail with special notation on ground that "require-
ment is easy to comply with" and remanding with respect to mail from public
officials); Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Turner, but
upholding restriction on access to religious ceremony on finding of valid, ra-
tional connection between restriction and security concerns and that restriction
was content-neutral) and Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1230 (6th Cir. 1987)
(pro se complaint held sufficient on reconsideration to withstand motion to dis-
miss even though under rational relationship standard of Turner court need
merely determine whether prison regulation is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests) with Monmouth County Correctional Inst. Inmates v.
Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 338-43 (3d Cir. 1987) (court vigorously scrutinized and
rejected asserted penological interests, applying Turner standard); Deer v. Carl-
son, 831 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (9th Cir. 1987) (after discussing availability of al-
ternatives, inmates' suggested accommodation and effect it would have on other
inmates and prison personnel, court concluded that there was valid, rational
connection between regulation prohibiting inmates from wearing headgear in
dining hall and concerns for cleanliness, security and safety) and Rodriguez v.
James, 823 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1987) (court found valid connection between
regulation requiring inspection of inmates' business mail and interest in
preventing inmates from defrauding merchants or incurring excessive debt, that
regulation did not prevent communication and that no alternative could accom-
modate inmates at de minimis cost).
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of official power that deprives prisoners of their retained rights. 20 5
Thus, it is further submitted that by employing a hierarchy of standards
of review, courts could give prison officials due deference and respect,
yet protect prisoners' fundamental rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
Prisoners' constitutional rights have only recently been recognized
as deserving protection. To the extent that the exercise of prisoners'
retained rights conflicts with penological objectives of security, disci-
pline and rehabilitation, some accommodation must be reached. Thus,
the Supreme Court has been challenged to determine how best to pro-
tect those rights which prisoners retain. To this end, the Supreme
Court, in Turner v. Safley, formulated a standard of review for regulations
challenged as impinging upon prisoners' rights. The standard, how-
ever, is inadequate to the task.
Although the Turner standard appears to provide an intermediate
level of scrutiny, the standard's heavy emphasis on deference robs it of
most of its bite. While the unique circumstances of confinement may
justify the Supreme Court's highly deferential posture toward the deci-
sions of prison administrators in certain instances, it is submitted that
such a stance is not appropriate in all cases. Yet, the Turner standard is
to be applied uniformly to review the whole range of challenges without
regard to whether the regulation at issue merely limits or totally
abridges the exercise of a right or whether the activity in which the in-
mate seeks to engage is dangerous or harmless. In the name of defer-
ence, the Turner standard largely ignores these considerations to the
detriment of prisoners' rights. Whereas the Supreme Court's standard
seems to be forcing a fit in situations where "one size does not fit all,"
the Abdul Wali standard provides varying levels of scrutiny sensitive to
the circumstances of each particular challenge. It is submitted that such
a standard is better suited to the task of accommodating both prisoners'
rights and penological interests.
Lorijean Golichowski Oei
205. For a discussion of the rights retained by prisoners, see supra notes 41-
43 and accompanying text.
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